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NOTES AND COMMENTS
Banks and Banking-Right of Depositor to Direct
Application of Deposit in Insolvent Bank.
A depositor in an insolvent bank requested the liquidating agent
to apply his deposit to certain of his notes adequately secured by in-
dorsements. This request was refused and the deposit was applied
to another note of the depositor's inadequately secured by a deed of
trust. Held: the depositor could have the deposit applied in accord-
ance with his directions.'
As a general rule, a depositor who is indebted to a bank is entitled
to set-off the amount to his credit against his indebtedness. 2 This
"In re Merchant's Bank of Durham, 204 N. C. 472, 168 S. E. 676 (1933)
noted in (1933) 86 A. L. R. 993.
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right of set-off is mutual, and where a depositor's debt to a bank is
due, the bank has the right to apply the deposit as a payment, pro
tanto, on the indebtedness.3 If the bank is insolvent, the great
weight of authority is that the depositor may set-off his deposit
therein against his bona fide indebtedness to the bank,4 even though
the indebtedness was not due at the time the bank closed its doors.5
A corresponding right exists in favor of the bank in case of the
depositor's insolvency."
The right of the depositor to direct the application of the set-off
to a particular debt is not so well established, as there seems to be
only one other case on this point,7 and this was relied on by the
court in the instant decision.
The bank being solvent, the depositor would have the right to
apply his deposit to the payment of such of his debts to the bank as he
should choose.8 This is in line with the well established rule of the
application of payments.9 Since it is held that the insolvency of the
bank does not affect the right of set-off, it would seem to follow that
it does not affect the right of the depositor to direct its application,
provided such direction was made prior to any application by the
receiver.' 0 Support for this rule is found in the analogous field of
'Steelman v. Atchley, 98 Ark. 294, 135 S. W. 902 (1911) ; New First Na-
tional Bank v. Rhodes Produce Co., 58 S. W. (2d) 742 (Mo. 1933).
'Trust Co. v. Trust Co., 188 N. C. 766, 125 S. E. 536 (1924) ; Graham v.
Warehouse Co., 189 N. C. 533, 127 S. E. 540 (1925) ; Trust Co. v. Spencer,
193 N. C. 745, 138 S. E. 124 (1927) ; Coburn v. Carstarphen, 194 N. C. 368, 139
S. E. 596 (1927).
'Davis v. Manufacturing Co., 114 N. C. 321, 19 S. E. 371 (1894) ; Steelman
v. Atchley; Coburn v. Carstarphen, both supra note 3. The receiver of an
insolvent bank is merely an assignee, and choses in action pass subject to any
right of set-off existing at the time of his appointment. This right of set-qff
is to be governed by the state of things existing at the moment of insolvency
and not by conditions thereafter created. Williams v. Johnson, 50 Mont. 7,
144 Pac. 768 (1914).
' Steelman v. Atchley, supra note 2; Knaffle v. Knoxville Banking Co., 128
Tenn. 181, 159 S. W. 838 (1913). The effect of insolvency of a bank is to
make deposits due and actionable. Williams v. Johnson, supra note 4.
'Hodgin v. Bank, 124 N. C.-540, 32 S. E. 887 (1899). Contra: Homer v.
National Bank of Commerce, 140 Mo. 225, 41 S. W. 790 (1897).
' Hughes v. Garrett, 150 Ark. 404, 234 S. W. 265 (1921).
'First National Bank v. Rhodes Produce Co., supra note 2.
Lee v. Morley, 154 N. C. 244, 70 S. E. 385 (1911) ; Stone Co. v. Rich, 160
N. C. 161, 75 S. E. 1077 (1912).
" The creditor's right to make the application applies only where the debtor
has had an opportunity of exercising this right. Jones v. Williams, 39 Wis.
300 (1876). The right to apply payments is one existing strictly between the
original parties, and no third person has any authority to insist on an appro-
priation of the money in his own favor, where neither the debtor nor the
creditor has made or required any such appropriation. Wyandotte Coal Co. v.
Wyandotte Paving Co., 97 Kan. 203, 154 Pac. 1012 (1916).
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bankruptcy, where the rights of the parties to direct application of
payments remain unimpaired by the debtor's subsequent bankruptcy.11
The effect of this decision is: first, to allow the depositor-debtor
to secure the benefit of the full amount of his deposit, while the de-
positor against whom the bank has no claim receives only a pro rata
share; and, second, to allow the depositor, by directing the applica-
tion to the notes adequately secured, to leave the bank with the inade-
quately secured note, and thus further reduce dividends to the ordi-
nary depositor.1 2 At first blush this seems inequitable, but is this
really so ?
When both parties are solvent, the allowance of set-off is obviously
fair and expedient, since it avoids circuity of action and multiplicity
of suits; but when one of the parties becomes insolvent the rights of
the creditor who is also a debtor to set-off his claims against his obli-
gations comes into conflict with the equitable right of the general
creditors to share equally in the assets. But, as usually considered,
the assets of the insolvent bank consist not of all the obligations which
it holds, but only of the balance due after deducting the deposits. 18
Therefore, in the absen~ce of statutes, the allowance of set-off is no
violation of the rule of equality among creditors.1 4 To hold other-
wise would require the depositor to pay his own debt to the insolvent
in full, and receive only a dividend on the debt due from the insolvent
to him.
As to the second phase of the problem, it is, according to the
usual view, the depositor who is exercising the right of set-off, and
not the insolvent bank. It is he who in effect is making the pay-
ment. It is fundamental that the debtor has the right to have his
payments applied to debts of his own choice.' 5 If in fact a set-off
is a payment, there appears to be no logical reason why he should be
deprived of that right by the insolvency of his creditor.
However, the view might be taken that set-off, being mutual, is not
strictly a payment by either party, but rather an extinction of mutual
3In re Johnson, 125 Fed. 838 (E. D. N. C. 1903) ; 4 RMiNGTo N, BANK-
RuPTcY (3rd ed. 1923) 1475-1478.
32 For purposes of this contention it is assumed that the depositor is insol-
vent and the loan inadequately secured, or at least so regarded by the receiver.
Otherwise the application would- be immaterial.
I State v. Brabston, 94 Ga. 95, 21 S. E. 146 (1894) ; Miles v. Bossert, 92
Ind. App. 10, 173 N. E. 656 (1930).
" Bassett v. City Bank and Trust Co., 115 Conn. 1, 160 AtI. 60 (1932).
'Lee v. Morley; Stone Co. v. Rich, both supra note 9. Treating set-off
as a payment, an interesting question arises as to when it becomes a payment.
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debts. If this is true would it not be better to determine the debts to
be extinguished by the equities of the particular case, rather than to
leave such determination to the depositor?
Business men as well as courts seem frequently to regard bank
deposits as cash on hand rather than as a debt owed by the bank.1 6
It is interesting to conjecture on whether the court in the instant case
would have reached a like result had the parties been ordinary mutual
creditor and debtor instead of depositor and insolvent bank.
HERBERT H. TAYLOR, JR.
Brokers-Conditions Precedent to Right to Commissions.
In a recent federal case, the plaintiff sued to recover broker's
commissions on a sale of Florida real estate. The agreement imposed
the condition that they were "payable out of the second payment on
the said sale." Between the time of the sale and the due date for
the second payment, the Florida boom crashed; and, rather than take
the property back, the defendant-owner compromised with the buyer
for a sum less than that owing to the plaintiff for commissions. Held,
Soper, J., dissenting, plaintiff should be awarded the entire amount
collected on the compromise.' The case raises the problem of the
performance of express conditions precedent in real estate brokers'
contracts.
The classic condition precedent in these contracts is that the broker
obtain a purchaser ready, willing, and able to buy on the terms speci-
fied.2 Thus, in most cases the position of the broker is that of a
middleman whose job is to bring together the vendor and the pur-
chaser. This situation, of course, may be, and often is altered by con-
tract as when the making of a binding contract 3 or the payment of
the purchase money4 is made a condition precedent to the duty to
pay commissions. The rule in such cases is that the condition must be
complied with before a recovery can be had.5 The only general ex-
"Most bank statements, and statements of other businesses, carry this
item: "Cash on hand and on deposit with banks."1 Kendrick v. Speck, 67 Fed. (2d) 295 (C.C.A. 4th. 1933).
2 Ennis v. Cator, 174 S.W. 947 (Tex. Civ. App. 1915) (Purchaser provided
by broker refused administrator's deed. Held, no recovery as he was not
ready and willing).
3-Espalla v. Warren, 197 Ala. 601, 73 So. 23 (1916); Taylor v. Freedman,
103 N. J. L. 403, 135 At. 867 (1927).
'Van Norman v. Fitchette, 100 Minn. 145, 110 N. W. 851 (1907). Also in
this category are listed the agreements under which the broker takes all above
a specified sum. Lewis v. Briggs, 81 Ark. 96, 98 S. W. 683 (1906).
'Supra notes 3 and 4.
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ception is that the owner may not himself prevent the occurrence of
the condition.8 The principal case comes within this exception on the
grounds of waiver.
There are, however, certain cases in which the rigidity of the
rule thus stated has been somewhat modified. These may be grouped
under three heads: (1) where there has been an occurrence substan-
tially equivalent to the condition precedent ;7 (2) where the owner
has been benefited by the services, the broker has sometime been
allowed to recover the full commission on a theory approaching
quantum reruit;s and (3) where the broker has incurred expense
before the agency was revoked.9 Here the broker is reimbursed. In
the first two classes, however, the recovery allowed has been either
the entire commission or nothing.' 0 There has seldom been an attempt
to pro rate the benefits" or to make the award responsive to the actual
facts.12
It would seem, in theory at least, that this is wrong. When an
owner hires a broker under an ordinary contract,, their minds meet
on the idea that the commissions are to be paid for the contingent
benefits that the owner will receive by meeting a purchaser ready,
* willing, and able. On the other hand, when a condition must be met,
the idea is rather that payment is for the concrete completed benefit
which the owner then will have received; so much so, indeed, that
unless the specified benefit is received, the broker in these contracts,
does not usually get paid for his work. Thus the subject-matter of
' Several theories are adopted as the 'basis of this exception: (1) Implied
contract on part of owner. Atkinson v. Pack, 114 N. C. 597, 19 S. E. 628
(1894) ; (2) Waiver of the condition. Tarbell v. Bomes, 135 Atl. 604 (R. 1.
1927) ; (3) Estoppel. Kenzig v. Cibula, 40 Ohio App. 557, 179 N. E. 423 (1931).7Helmke v. Prasifka, 17 S. W. (2d) 463 (Tex. Civ. App. 1929) (Hypothe-
cation for full value after default of purchaser on notes held substantially
equivalent to payment). But see Trimue v. McCaleb, 172 Ark. 137, 287 S. W.
740 (1926) (Cancellation of notes when insolvent purchaser deeds back property
is not payment as contemplated in the contract) ; Coleman v. Edgar Lumber Co.,
155 Ark. 275, 244 S. W. 41 (1922) (Foreclosure will not replace a specified pay-
ment for a condition precedent.)
'Lesser v. W. B. McGerry & Co., 8 P. (2d) 1058 (Cal. App. 1933); Der-
mody v. N. J. Realties, 101 N. J. L. 334, 128 Atl. 265 (1925).
'Gossett v. McCracken, 189 N. C. 115, 126 S. E. 117 (1925). Contra:
Abbott v. Hunt, 129 N. C. 403, 40 S. E. 119 (1901).
" Supra, notes 7, 8 and 9.
a' But see Gilder v. Davis, 137 N. Y. 504, 33 N. E. 599 (1893). (Broker was
awarded 5% of the down payment which was forfeited. Contract called for
5% of the sale price.)
" Note suggestion in (1932) 32 CoL. L. R-v. 1194, at 1199 to the effect
that in forfeiture cases recovery should be based on whether or not the deposit
which was forfeited took into account the broker's commissions. The sugges-
tion was repudiated in Amies v. Wesnofsky, 255 N. Y. 156, 174 N. E. 436 (1931).
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the contract is the actual benefit to the owner. If a substantial sub-
stitute for the specified benefit is received, or if it is materially dimin-
ished it would seem that the broker should recover an amount pro-
portionate to the revised conditions.
It may be objected that this is impractical either (1) because
it would lead to uncertainty in the law, or (2) because it would be
too difficult to determine the ratio. The answer to the first is that
this would be no more uncertain than in other fields, such as construc-
tion contracts, where recovery is allowed upon substantial perform-
ance. 13 The answer to the second is that a similar job is being done
in other cases by quantum meruit. It is submitted, therefore, that
although the court in the principal case is in accord with the majority,
the result suggested by the dissent would have been the more satis-
factory disposition of the problem before it.
PETER HAIRSTON.
Conflict of Laws-Construction of the Law of a Sister State.
Defendant drove his automobile at 45 to 50 miles an hour over
ridges of soft sand or "camel backs" along a Virginia beach until
within a few feet of a known and visible obstruction in the form of a
wrecked vessel protruding out of the sand. Plaintiff's intestate, a
gratuitous guest in the rumble seat, protested several times at the rate
of speed because those in the rumble were "bouncing . . . all the
time." When defendant swerved the car to avoid hitting the wreck,
the car overturned and plaintiff's intestate was killed. Suit was
brought in North Carolina. The court, applying the rule of lex loci,'
held, the defendant liable for the guest's death because of gross negli-
gence.2 North Carolina adheres to the orthodox rule that, with regard
to questions of common law, the court of one state will follow the
decisions of another state in which the cause of action had its
situs ;3 in the instant case, the court declared that it must be governed
by Virginia decisions.4 Virginia now follows5 the Massachusetts
" Jacobs & Young, Inc. v. Kent, 230 N. Y. 239, 129 N. E. 889 (1921).
'Howard v. Howard, 200 N. C. 574, 158 S. E. 101 (1931); Goowucg,
ComIcT oF LAWS (1927) §92.2Wise v. Hollowell, 205 N. C. 286, 171 S. E. 82 (1933).
'See Harrill v. S. C. & G. Extension R. Co., 135 N. C. 601, 615, 47 S. E.
730; Note (1931) 73 A. L. R 897.
'Wise v. Hollowell, supra note 2, at 288 ("The accident... occurred..
in Virginia. The measure of the defendant's duty and the question of his
liability for negligence must be determined by the law of that state.")
Boggs v. Plybon, 157 Va. 30, 160 S. E. 77 (1931).
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rule8 in holding that an automobile host is liable to a gratuitous guest
only in the event of gross negligence.
This presents once more the old question as to what is gross neg-
ligence, and more particularly, what is gross negligence in Virginia.
In the principal case, the trial court charged the jury that, to hold the
defendant liable, they must find him guilty of "wanton and culpable
negligence." The court defined wanton as "implying reckless and
criminal indifference to consequences or to the rights of others," and
culpable as "a heedless indifference to right and safety 6f others."
7
In the majority opinion approving this charge on appeal, the court
cited a North Carolina cases and a general law dictionary.9 Similarly,
the dissenting judge declared that gross negligence was not evidenced
in the fact situation in the instant case, not because of non-con-
formity to any Virginia definition of wanton and culpable negligence,
but rather because the facts failed to measure up to a definition set
forth in still another North Carolina case.' 0
On the other hand, the Virginia court, in reviewing cases in which
recovery was sought for accidents taking place in North Carolina, has
not only followed the rule found in North Carolina cases allowing
recovery by gratuitous guests for ordinary negligence," but also has
approved North Carolina, and not Virginia, definitions of ordinary
negligence. 12 Thus, it would seem that whin North Carolina attempts
to adjudicate the rights of parties on the basis of a Virginia concep-
tion of the degree of negligence requisite to establish liability, it should
not content itself with adopting the Virginia label of wanton, gross, or
'Enunciated in Massaletti v. Fitzroy, 228 Mass. 487, 118 N. E. 168 (1917).
The court in this case defines and distinguishes slight, ordinary, and gross neg-
ligence.
" Wise v. Holloway, supra note 2, at 289.
'Everett v. Receivers, 121 N. C. 519, 27 S. E. 991 (1897), cited in the prin-
cipal case, supra note 2, at 290.
'BLACK, LAW DIcTIONARY, 304, 1217, cited in the principal case, supra note
2, at 290.
"o State v. Cope, 204 N. C. 28, 167 S. E. 456 (1933), cited in principal case,
supra note 2, at 291.
" See Albritton v. Hill, 190 N. C. 429, 130 S. E. 5 (1925). In some states
the liability of a motorist to a gratuitous guest has, by judicial decisions, been
limited to gross negligence, Massaletti v. Fitzroy, supra note 6; Epps v. Parish,
26 Ga. App. 399, 106 S. E. 297 (1923). In other states the limitation of liability
to cases of gross negligence has been effected by statute, CoNe. GEN. STAT.
(1930) §1628; IowA CODE (1927) §5026-bl; Mixc. CouP. LAws (1929) §4648;
VT PuB. LAws (1929) No. 78. For a proposed North Carolina statute, see
(1930) 9 N. C. L. REv. 47.
" Baise v. Hollifield, 158 Va. 498, 164 S. E. 657 (1932) ; Baise v. Warren,
158 Va. 505, 164 S. E. 655 (1932) ; see Clark v. Parker, 171 S. E. 600 (Va.
1933) (decided on basis of plaintiff's contributory negligence.)
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culpable negligence, and then proceed to define these terms on the
basis of North Carolina law, but should rather look to Virginia de-
cisions for an interpretation of these terms. The Virginia court has
decided several cases involving the question of gross negligence of an
automobile host.13 Theoretically, the proper criteria for ascertaining
the Virginia definition of gross negligence would have been found in
these cases. Actually, they shed little light on the general subject as
they were all decided on the basis of particular fact situations. At
least one case, by analogy, indicates that the Virginia court might have
arrived at a result different from the North Carolina court.14
To define ordinary negligence in a manner that will satisfy all
persons and all situations is well-nigh impossible. The introduction
of "gross" negligence has had the primary effect of adding confu-
sion to an already complicated subject.15 For example, in the prin-
cipal case, the court approved of "criminal indifference" as a constit-
uent of gross and culpable negligence, and yet declared a few sen-
tences later that negligence could be culpable without being criminal.
One English judge has declared: "I . . .see no difference between
negligence and grass negligence-that it (is) the same thing, with
the addition of a vituperative epithet."'16 Perhaps, in the instant
'Boggs v. Plybon, supra note 5 (In which the court laid down the test of
the defendant automobile host's liability as being whether or not the defendant
knowingly and wantonly added to those perils which may ordinarily be ex-
pected and held it not to be gross negligence that defendant inadvertently drove
so far over on right side of road that he ran off the side of the road into a soft
shoulder and collided with a telephone pole) ; Jones v. Massie, 158 Va. 121,
163 S. E. 63 (1932), (where recovery was sought for injuries received in an
accident resulting from defendant's failure to see a drainage depression in the
street, held, as a matter of law that defendant was not guilty of gross negli-
gence, although he could have seen the defect in the pavement, and stopped
the car in time to prevent the accident, had he been keeping a proper look-out).
Two other Virginia cases decided, after the trial, but prior to the handing down
of the appellate decision in the principal case involved similar situations. Collins
v. Robinson, 160 Va. 520, 169 S. E. 609 (1933) (defendant held liable for gross
negligence in an accident resulting from driving-in violation of a statute-
on the wrong side of the road around a curve at night, knowing another car
was approaching from the opposite direction because of the reflection of its
lights, although he could not see it) ; see Young v. Dyer, infra note 14.
' Young v. Dyer, 170 S. E. 737 (Va. 1933) (In an accident resulting in a
car overturning on a sharp curve when defendant was driving 50 miles an hour
along an unfamiliar curving highway, despite a mild warning uttered by plain-
tiff, defendant was not guilty, as a matter of law, of gross negligence in the
absence of circumstances indicating that the curve could not be negotiated at
such speed, or in the absence of vehement protests by the guest. The court
declared that failure to be alert and observant and to operate a car at a low
rate of speed might be ordinary negligence, but is not gross negligence.).
3 This objection was recognized by the Virginia court when first adopting
the gross negligence rule. Boggs v. Plybon, supra note 5. Nevertheless, the
court decided to set up and differentiate between degrees of negligence.
'Wilson v. Brett, 11 M. & W. 113,-115, 152 Eng. Rep. 737, 739 (1843).
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case and in similar cases, the court could more nearly approximate the
law of a foreign jurisdiction if, drawing from decided cases in the
foreign state, it would charge the jury as to illustrative analogous fact
situations, rather than as to misleading substantive definitions.
HARRY W. McGALLIARD.
Conflict of Laws-Jurisdiction-Res Judicata.
A surety after an ex parte judgment against it on a supersedeas
bond, made a general appearance and moved to vacate for lack of
jurisdiction. The motion was granted but on appeal to the state
Supreme Court, the order was reversed. The surety then sought to
enjoin the enforcement of the judgment in the federal district court.
On certiorari to review the decision of the Circuit Court of Appeals
which reversed the district court's denial of the injunction, held, as
there has been an actual adjudication of the trial court's jurisdiction,
that issue is res judicata.1
The clause of the constitution which requires that full faith and
credit be given by each state to the judicial proceedings of other
states, applies only to those judgments rendered by courts which had
jurisdiction over both the parties and the subject matter. Therefore
the jurisdiction of a court rendering a judgment is said always to be
open to inquiry where it is drawn in question collaterally in another
state.
2
This broad rule is, however, limited by numerous exceptions.
Where the question of the court's jurisdiction is squarely presented
for its consideration, either by a general or special appearance and
motion to dismiss3 or a motion to vacate4 and the issue is determined
" American Surety Co. v. Baldwin, 287 U. S. 156, 53 Sup. Ct. 78, 77 L, ed.
231 (1932). The effect of this case from a procedural standpoint is that the
jurisdiction of a court remains open to attack only if the defendant makes
no appearance at all or if he appeals at every step on an adverse holding on
the question of jurisdiction until the U. S. Supreme Court passes on it.
' Thompson v. Whitman, 18 Wall. 457, 21 L. ed. 897 (U. S. 1872) ; National
Exchange Bank v. Wiley, 195 U. S. 257, 25 S. Ct. 70, 49 L. ed. 184 (1904) ;
Old Wayne Mutual Life Assoc. of Indianapolis v. McDonough, 204 U. S. 8,
27 Sup. Ct. 236, 51 L. ed. 345 (1907) ; Bonnett-Brown Corp. v. Cable, 195 N. C.
491, 142 S. E. 772 (1928).
Chicago Life Ins. Co. v. Cherry, 244 U. S. 25, 37 Sup. Ct. 492, 61 L. ed.
966 (1917). (The issue as to jurisdiction was raised and adjudicated after a full
hearing in the former case. The matter was thought to stand differently from
a tacit assumption or mere declaration in the record that the court had juris-
diction)_; Sipe v. Copwell, 59 Fed. 970 (C. C. A. 6th, 1894); Thomas v.
Virden, 160 Fed. 696 (C. C. A. 2d, 1903); Northwestern Casualty & Surety
Co. v. Conaway, 210 Iowa 126, 230 N. W. 548 (1930).
For cases dealing with a contested hearing as to whether or not the cor-
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by a contested hearing, such adjudication is held to be res judicata
in a sister state. Likewise, when lack of jurisdiction has been inter-
posed as a defense to a suit on a foreign judgment, a finding by the
court in favor of the jurisdiction of the first state will become res
judicata in a third state.5 Similarly the question is thereafter closed
to attack in the first state.6 In all of these situations a finding of
jurisdiction will be held conclusive, regardless of how erroneous it
may'be.7 The theory on which such result is reached nowhere appears
in the opinions of the courts. It has been suggested that the solution
lies in the concept of a limited and ultimate jurisdiction.8 By a
special or general appearance and a motion to dismiss or vacate, the
limited jurisdiction of the court is invoked. But such action is in
addition a submission of the issue of the court's own ultimate juris-
diction, that is, its power to give a valid judgment on the merits,
or the ultimate jurisdiction of the court which rendered the foreign
judgment. It is this determination which is res judicata in the courts
of a sister state.
Some courts say that an affirmative showing of jurisdiction in
the judgment record or in the officer's return is conclusive of the
poration was doing business in the state see: Baldwin v. Iowa State Traveling
Men's Ass'n., infra note 8; Michigan v. Virginia Fire and Marine Ins. Co., 10
Fed. 696 (E. D. Va. 1882); Supell-Vinner-Jordan v. Crite Mills, 51 F. (,2d)
1028 (C. C. A. 8th, 1931); Sartain v. Avery Co. 217 Ill. App. 286 (1920)
(The question of jurisdiction held to be open since the court had taken no actiQn
on the plea to jurisdiction); Hall v. Wilder Mfg. Co., 316 Mo. 812, 293 S. W.
760 (1927).
'John Simmon Co. v. Sloan, 104 N. J. L. 612, 142 Atl. 15 (1928) ; Finkel-
stein v. Win. H. Block & Co., 124 Misc. Rep. 610, 208 N. Y. Supp. 401 (1925).
Contra: Marshall v. Owen & Co., 171 Mich. 232, 137 N. W. 204 (1902)
(Held, denial of a motion to vacate a judgment being -merely interlocutory and
not a final judgment it does not prevent a collateral attack in a sister state);
Howard v. Smith, 3 Jones & S. 131 (N. Y. 1872).
'Degge v Baxter, 69 Colo. 122, 169 Pac. 580 (1917).
'Bailey v. Wilson, 52 Misc. Rep. 644, 103 N. Y. S. 1021 (1907); Hanna
v. Stedman, 230 N. Y. 326, 130 N. E. 566 (1921) ; Harju v. Anderson, 133 Wash.
506. 234 Pac. 15 (1925).
'Northwestern Casualty & Surety Co. v. Conaway, supra note 3; Littlefield
v. Paynter, 111 Kan. 201, 206 P. 114 (1922); Tyson's Adm'x. v. Ill. Cent. R. Co.,
151 Ky. 185, 151 S. W. 404 (1912). Contra: Ray v. Pilot Fire Ins. Co., 128
S. C. 323, 121 S. E. 779 (1924).
1 (1928) 41 HARV. L. REv. 1055; see Baldwin v. Iowa State Traveling Men's
Assoc., 283 U. S. 522, 51 Sup. Ct. 517, 75 L. ed. 1244 (1931) (The special
appearance gives point to the fact that the respondent entered the Missouri
court for the very purpose of litigating the question of jurisdiction) ; North-
western Casualty & Surety Co. v. Conoway, supra note 3 (The court clearly
had jurisdiction to determine whether or not defendant was immune from
service of process. The filing of the motion to quash necessarily invoked
jurisdiction of the court for that purpose).
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issue 9 but the weight of authority favors the view that the record
recital may be assailed by proof that no jurisdiction was obtained.1
Indeed it would seem contradictory to say that a judgment may always
be attacked for lack of jurisdictiQn but that its record cannot be im-
peached. Further, a finding of jurisdiction is binding in a sister state
where it is the result of the construction of a statute by the highest
tribunal of the first state.i " In some states an appeal from an adverse
ruling on a motion to attack jurisdiction submits the person of the
defendant to the jurisdiction of the court, so as to render moot the
validity of the order appealed from.12 Other courts hold that an
appeal on the merits submits appellant to the jurisdiction of the court
and renders the judgment unimpeachable in a sister state for lack of
jurisdiction.' 3 In one case where a party unsuccessfully prosecuted
two appeals in which the question of jurisdiction was not presented
it was held that the defense of lack of jurisdiction was foreclosed on
the ground that a failure to make a defense by a party who is in court
is generally equivalent to making the defense and having it over-
ruled.14 Still another concluding factor is found where a defendant
makes a special appearance to object to jurisdiction in a state which
by statute makes such appearance a general appearance and submis-
sion to the jurisdiction of the court. 15
The treatment to -be given a finding of jurisdictional facts by the
courts of a sister state presents another problem. Some courts dis-
tinguish between jurisdictional and quasi-jurisdictional facts, the
former concerning the jurisdiction of the person and the subject
matter and the latter dealing with facts which have to be alleged and
9Rice v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 152 Ark. 498, 238 S. W. 772 (1922);
Smolinsky v. Fed. Reserve Life Ins. Co., 126 Kan. 506, 268 Pac. 830 (1928).0 Thompson v. Whitman, supra note 2; Steer v. Iowa State Traveling Men's
Assoc., 199 Iowa 118, 201 N. W. 328 (1924) ; Bonnett-Brown Corp. v. Cable,
supra note 2; Price v. American Surety Co. of New York, 59 S. W. (2d)
426 (Tex. Civ. App. 1933).
'American Ry. Express Co. v. F. S. Royster Guano Co., 273 U. S. 274,
47 Sup. Ct. 355, 71 L. ed. 642 (1925); Grubb v. Public Utilities Comm., 281
U. S. 470, 50 S. Ct. 374, 74 L. ed. 972 (1930); Glos v. Sankey, 148 Ill. 536,
36 N. E. 628 (1893).
Chinn v. Foster-Milburn Co., 195 Fed. 158 (W. D. N. Y. 1912) ; Marshall
v. Owen & Co., supra note 4. Contra: Bank of Jasper v. First National Bank,
258 U. S. il2, 42 Sup. Ct. 202, 66 L. ed. 490 (1922) ; Rush v. Childers, 209 Ky.
119, 272 S. W. 404 (1925) ; John Simmons Co. v. Sloan, supra note 4.
'Bank of Jasper v. First National Bank, supra note 12; Roach v. Privett,
90 Ala. 391, 7 So. 808 (1890) ; Merrimac Mfg. Co. v. Bubb, 119 Ark. 443, 178
S. W. 403 (1915). Contra: Jones v. Jones, 108 N. Y. 415, 15 N. E. 707 (1888).
" Gila Bind Reservoir & Irrigation Co. v. Gila Water Co., 205 U. S. 279,
27 Sup. Ct. 495, 51 L. ed. 801 (1905).
'Mo. K. & T. Ry. Co. v. Goodrich, 213 Fed. 339 (C. C. A. 8th, 1914).
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proven before the court can act. Such courts hold that the finding of
a quasi-jurisdictional fact by a court cannot be collaterally attacked
in another state.1 6 Other courts designate all facts which must be
alleged and proven before proceeding to judgment as jurisdictional
facts. Of the courts taking such view, some say that the finding is
invulnerable to collateral attack1 7 while others rule that a court can-
not by a finding of jurisdiction in its favor preclude an inquiry. s
Practically all courts agree, that a judgment may be attacked in
another state where a court is fraudulently induced to assume juris-
diction, 19 or where the judgment was obtained by fraudulently pro-
curing a party's appearance in the foreign state.2 0 There is, how-
ever, some intimation that even under such circumstances a finding of
jurisdictional fact will be considered final in a sister state since the
existence of fraud would necessarily be investigated and determined
by the court making the finding.21
In cases concerning divorce the question of the conclusiveness of
a finding of jurisdictional fact is complicated by the divergent views
as to what constitutes jurisdiction for divorce. Many states hold
I Noble v. Union River Logging Rd. Co., 147 U. S. 165, 173, 13 Sup. Ct.
271, 37 L. ed. 123 (1893) ; Stuart v. Dickinson, 290 Mo. 576, 235 S. W. 446
(1921) (domicile in divorce); Roszell Bros. v. Continental Coal Corp., 235
Fed. 343 (W. D. Ky. 1916) (principal place of business in bankruptcy suit).
'
TRice v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., supra note 9 (action for appointment
of administrator) ; Torrey v. Bruner, 60 Fla. 365, 53 So. 337 (1910) (domicile
in the probate of a will) ; Barnes v. Brownslee, 97 Kan. 517, 155 Pac. 962(1916) (probate of a will, held, as the jurisdiction of the court depended Qn
due service of a citation, the fact that jurisdiction was exercised implies a
finding that legal notice was given) ; City of St. Louis v. United Ry. Co. of St.
Louis, 263 Mo. 387, 174 S. W. 78 (1914) (The United States Supreme Court
necessarily decided that it had jurisdiction before it took the case and there-
fore the issue is res judicata); Citizens' Bank & Trust Co. v. Moore, 215 Mo.
App. 212, 263 S. W. 530 (1924) (In the appointment of a guardian of a minor,
the finding of residence of the minor is conclusive) ; James Mills Orchards
Corp. v. Frank, 137 Misc. Rep. 407, 244 N. Y. S. 473 (1930) (Where the
length of time allowed for answering was increased pro rata with the distance
the party lived from the court house, held, since the court probably passed on
the time and distance and found facts giving it jurisdiction the judgment is
not subject to collateral attack on the ground that the judgment was entered
before the time for answer expired).
I Sullivan v. Kenney, 148 Iowa 361, 126 N. W. 349 (1910) ; Morressey v.
Rodgers, 137 Kan. 626, 21 P, (2d) 359 (1933); Tulle v. Flint, 186 N. E.
222 (Mass. 1933) ; CoNFLIcT OF LAWS RESTATEmENT (Am. L. Inst. 1926) §490.
"Simmons v. Simmons, 19 F. (2d) 690 (App. D. C. 1927) ; Gordan v. Hill-
man, 47 Cal. App. 571, 191 Pac. 621 (1920); Wagoner v. Wagoner, 287 Mo.
567,229 S. W. 1064 (1921) ; State v. Herron, 175 N. C. 754, 94 S. E. 698 (1917).
'Dunlap & Co. v. Cody, 31 Iowa 260, 7 Am. Rep. 129 (1871) ; Greenbaum
v. Greenbaum, 147 Misc. Rep. 411, 263 N. Y. Supp. 774 (1933).
"Noble v. Union River Logging Rd. Co., supra note 16; Barnes v. Browns-
lee, upra note 17.
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that if one of the parties to the action is domiciled therein, that
is sufficient to confer jurisdiction to enter such decree. Of these
some hold that the adjudication of domicile is always open to attack. 22
Others say that since the existence of a bona fide domicile had to be
alleged and proved before the court could entertain jurisdiction, its
existence was necessarily determined and is therefore binding.23 Still
others hold that adjudication as to domicile will be treated as con-
clusive on the ground of comity. 24 Of course when the question of
jurisdiction has been raised and determined on a contested hearing,
it is res judicata. 25 Another view is that the offending party con-
sents to have his interest in the marriage status determined in the
state where the non-offending spouse is domiciled. Such courts per-
mit an inquiry into the justification for the acquiring of the separate
domicile by the non-offending party, when a foreign decree is
offered.26
The result reached in the principal case on the point of jurisdic-
tion seems to be desirable. There is no reason why a person who
has had due process should be permitted to retry the issue of
jurisdiction. For the purpose of avoiding litigation and the confusion
which is bound to follow where the original adjudication was one
either in personam or affecting status, it would seem that an adjudi-
cation of jurisdiction on a contested hearing or the finding of a juris-
dictional fact, should possess the quality of finality.
CECILE L. PILTZ.
Conditional Sales-Vendee's Right to Possession
Before Default.
A note given for a mule contained the stipulation that the mule
was to remain the property of the seller, until the note was paid in
full. The court held this to be a chattel mortgage and added that
although ordinarily the mortgagee was entitled to possession, here
'Andrews v. Andrews, 188 U. S. 14, 23 Sup. Ct. 237, 47 L. ed. 366 (1203);
Dunham v. Dunham, 162 Ill. 489, 44 N. E. 841 (1896).
"In re James' Estate, 99 Cal. 374, 33 Pac. 1122 (1893); Lieber v. Lieber,
239 Mo. 1, 143 S. W. 458 (1911); Fairchild v. Fairchild, 53 N. J. Eq. 678, 34
Atl. 10 (1896).
Mathews v. Mathews, 139 Ga. 123, 76 S. E. 855 (1912) ; Perkins v. Perkins,
225 Mass. 82, 113 N. E. 841 (1916); Howey v. Howey, 240 S. W. 450 (Mo.
1922).
-2 Blakeslee v. Blakeslee, 213 Ill. App. 168 (1919); Crane v. Deacon, 253
S. W. 1068 (Mo. 1923).
'Delanoy v. Delanoy, 216 Cal. 27, 13 P. (2d) 719 (1932); Thompson v.
Thompson, 89 N. J. Eq. 70, 103 Atl. 856 (1918).
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there was an implied agreement that the right to possession was to
be in the mortgagor.'
The treatment of this conditional sale as a chattel mortgage is in
accordance with the North Carolina Court's repeated refusal to recog-
nize any distinction.2 But the court having reached such result be-
came dissatisfied with the legal effect, which is to give the possession
to the conditional vendor, whom the court calls the mortgagee.3 An
implied agreement, that the mortgagor was to have possession, found
from facts outside the note, furnished a convenient solution.
Such implications may of course be drawn from the wording of
the contract.4 But if no provision for possession can be found in
the mortgage, the legal implication that the mortgagee is to have
possession becomes as much a part of the contract as if it were writ-
ten.5 And such legal effect may not be varied by implications from
facts outside the instrument.6 A decision of its own to this effect
was overlooked by the North Carolina Court.
7
An analogous situation is found where a parol agreement, that the
mortgagor is to retain possession, prior to or contemporaneous with
the written contract, is introduced to vary the legal consequences of
the mortgage. According to the better opinion such evidence is in-
admissible8 except where fraud or mistake can be proved.9 And in a
IGrier v. Weldon, 205 N. C. 575, 172 S. E. 200 (1934)'.
2 (1931) 11 N. C. L. REv. 321.3 lbid.
'Hardeson v. Plummer, 152 Ala. 619, 44 So. 591 (1907) ; Phillips v. Hart-
selle, 17 Ala. App. 79, 81 So. 857 (1919) ; Clay v. Wren, 34 Me. 187 (1852);
Hall v. Sampson, 35 N. Y. 274, 91 Am. Dec. 56 (1866).
'East Birmingham Land Co. v. Dennis, 85 Ala. 565, 5 So. 317 (1889) ; City
of Covington v. Kanawha Coal & Coke Co., 121 Ky. 681, 89 S. W. 1126 (1906) ;
Cannon Coal & Mercantile Co. v. Universal Metal Co., 26 Okla. 615, 110 Pac.
720 (1910) ; Bryan v. Duff, 12 Wash. 233, 40 Pac. 963 (1895).
'Wakeman v. Banks, 2 Conn. 445 (1818); Jamieson v. Bruce, 6 Gill &
J. 72, 26 Am. Dec. 557 (Md. 1834); Mason v. Sault, 93 Vt. 412, 108 At.
267 (1919); see East Birmingham Land Co. v. Dennis, supra note 5. Coltra:
Jackson v. Hopkins, 18 Johns 487 (N. Y. 1820); Hill v. Winnsboro Granite
Corp., 112 S. C. 243, 99 S. E. 836 (1919) (The court called a conditional
sale a chattel mortgage and then found that there was an implied agreement that
the mortgagor was to have possession, from the fact that the mortgagor was left
in possession.)
'Hinson v. Smith, 118 N. C. 503, 24 S. E. 541 (1896) (Held, the fact that
the mortgagor was given possession did not amount to such a stipulation that
he should have such possession as would defeat the mortgagee's right to take
possession at any time) ; see Himphill v. Ross, 66 N. C. 477 (1872).
'Davis v. Lassiter, 20 Ala. 561 (1852); Case v. Winship, 4 Blackf. 425,
30 Am. Dec. 664 (Ind. 1837); Robison v. Royce, 631 Kans. 886, 66 Pac. 646
(1901) ; see North River Ins. Co. of N. Y. v. Waddell, 112 So. 336 (Ala. 1927)
(Parol evidence that title was to remain in the vendor not admissible) ; Thom-
son v. Langston, 45 Cal. App. 415, 187 Pac. 970 (1920) (Oral understanding
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real estate mortgage, an oral agreement concerning the right to pos-
session, is held to be within the statute of frauds. 10 However, such
result can be obviated by partial performance; that is by putting the
mortgagor into possession."L A result contrary to the foregoing deci-
sions is reached where the oral stipulation for possession is subse-
quent to the mortgage.12
The principal case is an excellent example of confusion con-
founded. Had the court held the instrument to be a conditional sale,
which it actually was, and followed the usual rule in conditional sales,
the result it groped for would have followed as a matter of course.
But because it treats conditional sales as chattel mortgages, in order
to give the vendee the right to possession, it was necessary to find an
implied agreement. Since no such agreement appears in the contract,
it must have been implied from extrinsic facts, but the court gives
us no clue as to what they were. True the mortgagor actually had
possession and an implied agreement has been drawn from such a fact,
but the North Carolina Court has previously refused such inference.
And if the fact outside the mortgage from which the court drew its
implication was the usual understanding of the parties to a conditional
sale, that the conditional vendee is to have possession, what becomes
of the court's contention that there is no distinction between a con-
ditional sale and a chattel mortgage?
CECILE L. PiLTz.
Contempt-Administrative Acts of Judges.
A United States District Judge, who was under the statutory
duty of collecting certain fees and accounting for their expenditure,
sent, in this connection, a letter of instructions to the District Marshal.
Because of disrespectful language contained in his reply the Marshal
was adjudged guilty of contempt by the District Court. Reversed,
of the parties that mortgage was not to be enforced, constitutes no defense
to a mortgage foreclosure); Lion Brewing Co. v. Fricke, 204 App. Div.
470, 198 N. Y. Supp. 491 (1923). Contra: Butts v. Privett, 36 Kans. 711, 14
Pac. 247 (1887) ; Pierce v. Stevens, 30 Me. 184 (1849) (Such agreement does
not contradict the mortgage); Moore v. Hurtt, 124 N. C. 27, 32 S. E. 317(1899).
Berthold v. Fox, 13 Minn. 50, 97 Am. Dec. 243 (1868) ; see Sargent v.
Cooley, 12 N. D. 1, 94 N. W. 576 (1902).
"O Norton v. Webb, 35 Me. 218 (1853) ; see Hawkins v. Stoddard, 132 Ga.
265, 63 S. E. 852 (1909).
"Parker v. Hubble, 75 Ind. 580 (1881).
"Edwards v. Wray, 12 Fed. 42 (C. C. Ind. 1882) ; Rich v. Jackson, 4 Bro.
C. C. 514. 519, 29 Eng. Rep. 1017, 1020 (1794).
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held, criticism of a judge's ministerial act does not constitute con-
tempt of court.'
This case raises the question of the power of judges acting in
administrative or ministerial capacities, to punish for contempt. In
most instances it has been held that there can be no contempt when
the judges are not performing strictly judicial functions and the
following acts have been held not to be contempt of court: (1) criti-
cism by an expert accountant of the bookkeeping of a county judge
who was required by statute to keep account of the collection and ex-
penditure of certain fees and emoluments ;2 (2) addressing an in-
sulting demand to a justice of the peace for the payment of a judg-
ment collected by him for the demanding party;3 (3) addressing
offensive language to a justice of the peace concerning the allowance
of a poor rate ;4 (4) disturbing the acts of a parish judge while he
officiated as sheriff;5 (5) making a loud and angry demand upon a
justice of the peace while he was writing an official letter ;6 (6) calling
a magistrate a liar with reference to his absence from an election
when the other magistrates elected a person other than the offender
to a certain office.7
Other courts, however, have ruled that the power to punish for
contempt existed where: (1) twelve law students paid $2,000 to have
records in the office of the Clerk of the Supreme Court changed so as
to give theil passing grades on a bar examination ;8 (2) a ward of
a court was removed from the custody of the person with whom the
ward had been residing under the authority of the court;9 (3) a
judge was criticized for his refusal to appoint a co-receiver ;19 (4)
an executor refused to file his report with the clerk of the court,
serving ex-officio as probate judge."
It is noteworthy that of the cases which restrict the contempt
proceeding to protection of judicial functions 12 all but one were
decided before 1869 and that three of those-which extend its appli-
2 Statter v. United States, 66 F. (2d) 819 (C. C. A. 9th, 1933).
'Hamma v. People, 42 Colo. 401, 94 Pac. 326 (1908).
'Fitler v. Probasco, 2 Browne "137 (Pa. 1810).
4 Ibid.
'Detournion v. Dormenon, 1 Mart. 137 (La. 1810).
'Winship v. State, 51 Ill. 296 (1869).
Ex parte Chapman, 4 Ad. & El. 773, 111 Eng. Rep. 974 (1836).
& State v. Albin, 118 Ohio St. 527, 161 N. E. 792 (1928).
'Wellesley v. The Duke of Beaufort, 2 Russ. & M. 639, 39 Eng. Rep. 538(1831).
" Ex parte Craig, 282 Fed. 138 (C. C. A. 2d, 1922).
n In re Hege, 205 N. C. 625 (1934).
See Grandy v. State, 13 Neb. 445, 449, 14 N. W. 143, 145 (1882).
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cation have arisen since 1916. This might be said to indicate a ten-
dency to make the contempt weapon available to judges engaged in
administrative functions, but on closer inspection it appears that in
two of the cases of the latter class cited above the administrative action
of the judge was in furtherance of pending litigation, while in the
other two cases the judge was involved in duties traditionally thought
of as within the judicial power. There is thus little reason to believe
that any one of these courts would have reached an opposite result on
the facts presented in the principal case.
Because of the summary character of the proceeding in contempt
cases, the limited appellate review permitted, the absence of jury
trial, and because a judge may be both prosecutor and judge, many
might insist that the power to punish for contempt of court should
not be extended so as to be available to judges performing non-judicial
functions. It should be remembered, however, that judges have
been chosen to perform these administrative duties because of their
places of dignity, respect and authority in the community. The role
which is being played by judges and courts in our complex society
is rapidly being extended to include an enormous number of adminis-
trative duties distinct from judicial proceedings ;13 some of these are:
collection and disbursement of fees and fines; appointment and re-
moval of officers; supervision of elections; and granting licenses. If
disrespectful attacks may be made with impunity upon judges in
these non-judicial capacities, an adverse reaction upon their judicial
office is inevitable. 4 Is it not desirable to extend the power of
judges to punish for contempt of court to the same degree that the
range of their duties has been increased?
JOHN R. JENKINS, JR.
Contempt-Violation of Void Order.
Within ten days after a foreclosure sale the defendant increased
the bid and at a resale purchased the property. He failed to pay the
purchase price and was attached for contempt of court. He was sub-
sequently exonerated of the contempt but was ordered to pay into
'DODD, STATE GOVERNMENT (2d. ed. 1928) 303-305; WILLOUGHBY, PRINCI-
PLES OF JuiciAL ADMINISTRATION (1922) 220.
'In re Cheeseman, 49 N. J. L. 137, 6 Atl. 513 (1886).
Blackstone expresses this realization when he says that contempts may be
committed "by anything, in short, that demonstrates a gross want of that regard
and respect which, when once courts are deprived of, their authority is entirely
lost among the people." 4 COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND (Chris-
tian ed.) 285.
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court an amount stated to have been received by him as rents. He
denied having received this money. On an appeal to the Superior
Court the defendant was again ordered to pay these rents, which the
record showed had been collected by his wife, the owner of the fore-
closed property. On appeal held, since the order was void failure
to comply therewith did not constitute contempt.'
Disobedience of'a judicial order never constitutes contempt if the
court order is void, because of want of jurisdiction of parties2 or sub-
ject matter,3 or because made under an unconstitutional statute,4
or because there was denial of due process of law,5 or because con-
trary to public policy.6 If, however, the order be merely inadvertent,
erroneous or voidable violation is regarded by most courts as consti-
tuting contempt.7 Some courts relax the rigidity of the rule by declar-
ing the violated order void, when it is in fact only irregular.8 Others,
however, simply excuse violation of some erroneous judgments with-
out extending this immunity to all. 9 Most courts hold that appeal
is the proper relief, and not violation with a later defense based on
the impropriety of the order' 0 on the ground that the order is bind-
1 In re Longley, 205 N.. C. 488, 171 S. E. 788 (1933).
' Pennell v. Superior Court, 87 Cal. App. 375, 262 Pac. 48 (1927) ; Ex parte
Laughlin, 213 S. W. 154 (Mo. App. 1919).3 Ex parte Caylor, 22 Ala. App. 592, 118 So. 145 (1928) ; State v. Gordon, 105
Wash. 326, 177 Pac. 773 (1919).
'State v. Reid, 174 Wis. 536, 183 N. W. 992 (1921).
Ex parte Irwin, 320 Mo. 20, 6 S. W: (2d) 597 (1928) (no hearing);
Sinquefield v. Valentine, 160 Miss. 61, 133 So. 210 (1931) (no notice).
I People v. Burke, 72 Colo. 486, 212 Pac. 837 (1923) (A statute provided
that a named manner of electing corporation directors was the public policy
of the state. The court order in question provided for election in a different
manner. On appeal, held, the order could be violated with impunity since it
was void as being contrary to public policy.)
I People v. Morley, 72 Colo. 421, 211 Pac. 643 (1922) ; State v. Erickson, 66
Wash. 639, 120 Pac. 104 (1912).8 Armour Grain Co. v. Pittsburg Ry. Co., 320 Ill. 156, 150 N. E. 650 (1926)
(A statute required oral answers to interrogatories filed in certain cases. The
lower court held the statute applied to the defendant corporation and fined it
for contempt in refusing to answer. On appeal, the court ruled the statute did
not apply to a corporation as such and reversed the contempt on the ground
that the order was a "nullity".)
'McCann v. Jordan, 24 P.(2d) 457 (Cal. 1933); In re Berman, 173 App.
Div. 689, 160 N. Y. Supp. 79, 81 (1916) (An order was made directing the pay-
ment of funds by the defendant-assignee to a receiver. Upon refusal to com-
ply with the order the defendant was cited for contempt and found guilty. The
appellate court said: "Since the order directing the assignee to turn over the
assets to the receiver was unauthorized and contrary to the statute, the assignee
was right in resisting its enforcement, and the order punishing him as for con-
tempt must fall with the order which he refused to comply with") ; Di Raffaele
v. Gerkhardt, 217 App. Div. 187, 216 N. Y. Supp. 255 (1926).
" See Brougham v. Oceanic Steam Navigation Co., 205 Fed. 857, 860 (C.
C. A. 2d, 1913) ("But if a court have jurisdiction to make an order it must
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ing until vacated or reversed. But in passing judgment, the error in
the order is often considered in mitigation of punishment.
The basis of the decision of the principal case is that the order
was void. Was it? The court had jurisdiction of the parties and the
subject matter and the order was based on the clerk's mistaken notion
that the defendant could be made to pay over money collected by his
wife. This made the order merely reversible for error of law. It
was not a nullity.
Detailed regulation of contempt is provided for by statute in
North Carolina." For the consideration of the principal case several
sections were available: Section 978 (4) of the code, although relied
on by the court, is a division of the section framed to cover direct
contempts wherein the initiative is assumed by the solicitor; Sections
985 (2) and (7) and 727 deal with constructive contempts wherein
the plaintiff in an original suit invokes contempt proceedings in an
effort to enforce his judgment. But since section 727 expressly ex-
cuses inability to perform it is submitted that the principal case
should have so handled. 12
WILSON BARBER.
Criminal Law-Repeal of a Statute as Affecting Prosecutions
Thereunder.
The United States Supreme Court recently held that all prosecu-
tions for violation of the prohibition laws, including proceedings on
be obeyed, no matter how clearly it may be erroneous. Errors must be cor-
rected by appeal and not by disobedience. A person proceeded against for
violation of an injunction can never set up as a defense that the court erred
in issuing it. He must go further and make out that in law there was no
injunction because the court had no right to adjudicate. These principles have
been laid down over and over again . . .") ; O'Brien v. People, 216 Ill. 354, 75
N. E. 108, 113 (1905) ("It is a well known rule of law that, in proceedings
for contempt in failing to obey an order of court, the respondent may ques-
tion the ,order which he is charged with refusing to obey only insofar as he
can show it to be absolutely void, and cannot be heard to say that it was
merely erroneous, however flagrant it may appear to be. The judgments of
courts cannot be attacked collaterally for mere irregularities.").
I N. C. CoDE AxN. (Michie, 1931) §§978-986. §663 provides that disobe-
dience to a judgment requiring any act other than payment of money or delivery
of real or personal property may be punished as for contempt.
IN. C. CoDE ANN. (Michie, 1931) §727 provides as follows: "Any person,
party or witness, who disobeys an order of the court, judge or referee, duly
served, may be punished by the judge as for contempt. In all cases of commit-
ment under this article the person committed may, in case of inability to per-
form the act required, or to endure the imprisonment may be discharged from
imprisonment by the judge committing him, or the judge having jurisdiction,
on such terms as are just."
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appeal, continued or begun after ratification of the Twenty-first
Amendment, must be dismissed.' The Court, quoting Chief Justice
Marshall, says that "it has long been settled, on general principles,
that after the expiration or repeal of a law, no-penalty can be en-
forced, nor punishment inflicted, unless some specific provision be
made for that purpose by statute."2
The rule relied on in the present case was enunciated as early as
Hale's Pleas of the Crown s where, in commenting on a statute, the
author says, "It is . . . observable . . . that when an offense is
made treason or felony by an act of parliament, and then those acts
(sic) are repealed, the offenses committed before such repeal, and
the proceedings thereupon are discharged by such repeal ... unless a
special clause in the act of repeal be made enabling such proceed-
ing.. .". Practically the same language is found in the subsequent
work, Hawkins' Pleas of the Crown.4 Later, in Miller's Case,5 a dic-
tum of the court broadens the rule to cover any offense. The language
of Chief Justice Marshall in Yeaton v. U. S., 6 quoted in the instant
decision, is the authority most frequently cited in this country. This
decision was followed by a great many cases giving effect to "the
established doctrine." Research revealed only one reported decision
to the contrary-an early case in a lower court of Connecticut.7
What might be called the "common law rule" has been relied
upon to free the defendant where, at the time of the repeal of the
statute, he had not been indicted ;8 where he had been apprehended
indicted, but not yet put on trial ;9 where he had been convicted and
had not yet appealed ;1O where, after conviction, his appeal had been
docketed in the supreme court ;11 and where his case had been argued
in the supreme court, but the judgment had not yet been affirmed.12
The rule has not been applied where repeal comes after the highest
1 U. S. v. Chambers, 54 Sup. Ct. 434 (1934).
'Yeaton v. U. S., 5 Cranch 281, 283, 3 L. ed. 101 (1809).
'1 HAtL's PLEAS OF THE CROWN (Wilson ed. 1778) 291.
'1 HAwKI s' PLEAS OF THE CROWN (6th ed. 1788) c. 40, §6.
'1 Win. B1. 451, 96 Eng. Repr. 259 (1764).
Supra note 2.
Rex v. Hanson, 1 Root 59 (Conn. 1773) (decision limited to situations
where the crime was an offense ar common law).
'Commonwealth v. Marshall, 28 Mass. 358 (1831).
State v. Cress, 49 N. C. 421 (1857).
1 0State v. Nutt, 61 N. C. 20 (1866).
U. S. v. Tynen, 78 U. S. 88, 20 L. ed. 153 (1870).
Keller v. State, 12 Md. 322 (1858).
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court has affirmed the conviction, the matter then being'res judicata,
and beyond the judicial power. 18
What might be called the "statutory rule" was also enunciated
as far back as Hale's Pleas of the Crown. In the passage from this
author quoted above it will be noticed that when there is a "saving
clause", the defendant is not discharged. Evidently, even at that
time, judges and legislators were not in full accord on the question
of whether or not repeal of a statute should end prosecutions for its
violation.
The mildest form of legislative dissent from the rule applied by
the courts would seem to be exemplified by an enactment providing
that amendment of a statute shall not constitute repeal. 14 The next
form is shown by the inclusion in a repealing act of a clause allowing
punishment of offenses previously committed against the particular
statute repealed.' 5 Then comes the form of statute which has now
been adopted in many jurisdictions-a general saving clause applicable
to the repeal of any statute.' 6 Finally, in a few states, there are con-
stitutional provisions providing that repeal of a statute shall not be
A bar to prosecutions thereunder for offenses committed before the
repeal.' 7
In applying the common law rule, courts seldom state any
I State v. Addington, 2 Baily 516 (S. C. 1831) (defendant convicted and
sentenced to death; was pardoned upon condition he leave the state. The statute
under which he had been convicted was then repealed. Later, he was found
within the state. Held, execution must proceed, the matter is res judicala and
beyond the judicial power); Ex parte Andres, 237 S. W. 238 (Tex. Crim.
App. 1922) (defendant convicted and conviction affirmed. Statute then repealed,
and defendant makes application for writ of habeas corpus. Denied) ; cf.
Aaron v. State, 40 Ala. 307 (1867) (original plans for defendant's execution
having gone astray, he was again brought before the court. Upon performing
its statutory duty to "inquire into the case," the court found that the statute
under which the defendant was convicted had now been repealed, and that it
could not again pass sentence. A saving clause in the repealing act was denied
effect on ground that, final judgment having been passed before repeal, this
was not a "pending prosecution" within the clause. The court thus seems to
blow both hot and cold).
A unigue application of the rule is found in Utah, where, if judgment has
been affirmed by an appellate court, even though an intermediate court, before
the repeal, requirements of the rule are held to have been met. On subsequent
appeal to the Supreme Court, the judgment will be allowed to stand. Salina
City v. Lewis, 52 Utah 7, 172 Pac. 286 (1918).
'
4N. C. CODE ANN. (Michie 1931) § 3950.
'People v. Sloan, 2 Utah 326 (1878).
People v. Pratt, 67 Cal. App. 606, 228 Pac. 47 (1924); Lower v. State,
109 Neb. 590, 191 N. W. 674 (1923). Texas has a statute adopting the common
law rule, Sheppard v. State, 1 Tex. App. 522 (1877).
'FLA. CONST. (1885) ART. 3, §32; N. M. CosT. (1911) ART. 4, §33;
OKLA. CoNsr. (1907) ART. 5, §54.
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theory upon which the rule is based. At times they say the repealing
statute "acts as a bar to the prosecution", or "takes away the authority
to punish", or "operates as a legislative pardon". These would seem
to be merely restatements of the result reached. Judge Washington
offers a more satisfactory explanation: "The end of punishment is
not only to correct the offender, but to deter others from committing
like offenses ... if the legislature has ceased to consider the act...
an offense, these purposes are no longer to be answered, and punish-
ment is then unnecessary."' 8 Behind the statutory rule there is
probably the feeling that at least one purpose of punishment is to
instill respect for law as such, and that by punishing this defendant
for violation of the repealed statute, violations of other statutes will
be discouraged. 19
The Court in the principal case was evidently, not bound by the
provisions of the United States statute which embodies a general sav-
ings clause,20 the constitutional provisions involved being on a plane
above the enactments of Congress. The net effect of the adoption of
the Twenty-first Amendment, however, is the same as if Congress
had repealed the prohibition laws-in which event the statutory sav-
ing clause would have applied. It is conceivable that the Court might
have held that, the present situation being within the spirit of the
saving statute, past offenses must be punished. 2 '
HUGH L. LOBDELL.
Death-Limitation of Actions-Effect of Concealment of Cause
of Action Under Wrongful Death Statute.
The plaintiff's intestate was killed by the alleged wrongful act of
the defendant power company in 1926. In 1933 an action was brought
by the plaintiff as administrator against the power company, the
acting coroner, and the undertaker, alleging a conspiracy on their part
to conceal the death from the decedent's relatives, in pursuance of
Anonymous, Fed. Cas. No. 475 (1804).
It would be interesting to know to -what extent the pardoning power has
been used where the statute under which sentence was being served had been
repealed; to'know whether the common law rule or the statutory rule has been
carried out.
16 STAT. 432 (1871), 1 U. S. C. A. §29 (1927) ("The repeal of any statute
shall not have the effect to release . . . any penalty ... incurred under such
statute, unless the repealing Act shall so expressly provide. .. ')
I Cf. Funk v. U. S., 54 Sup. Ct. 212 (!33) (the court overthrows previous
rule on competency of. witness, looking largely to state statutes as indicative
of present day policy).
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which conspiracy the death certificate was not registered, and the rela-
tives were not informed of the death until within a, year before the
commencement of this action. Held, a demurrer to the complaint was
properly sustained.'
The result of the so-called "Death Acts"'2 was the creation of a
new statutory right of action,8 which must be brought in strict com-
pliance with the statute which grants it. The time limit is not a
statute of limitations, 4 and circumstances which might toll such a
statute will not permit an action for wrongful death after the expira-
tion of the prescribed period.5 The limitation is a condition annexed
to the cause of action, not a mere defense,0 and the plaintiff must show
compliance with this provision in order to make out a prima fade
case. 7
' Curlee v. Duke Power Co., 205 N. C. 644, 172 S. E. 329 (1934).
2The forerunner of such legislation in this country was the English statute
[9 and 10 VicT., c. 93 (1846)] popularly known as "Lord Campbell's Act".
Similar statutes, though differing somewhat in their provisions, have now
been adqpted in most of the states in this country. For example: N. C. CODE
ANx. (Michie, 1931) §160.
'Baker v. Bolton, 1 Camp. 493, 170 Eng. Rep. 1033 (1808) ("In a civil Court,
the death of a human being could not be complained of as an injury; and in
this case the damages, as to the plaintiff's wife, must stop with the period of
her existence."). But see Sullivan v. Union Pacific R. Co., Fed. Cas. No. 13, 599
(C. C., Neb., 1874) ; Note (1900) 70 Am. St. Rep. 687.
It ha$ been held, however, that the limitation is also a time limit to proce-
dure, and, hence, a non-resident suing for a death occurring in Florida must
bring his action within the one-year period prescribed by the North Carolina
statute, and is not entitled to the two years allowed by the Florida statute.
Tieffenburn v. Flannery, 198 N. C. 397, 151 S. E. 857 (1930) commented upon(1930) 8 N. C. L. REv. 452.
8Kostoras v. Hines, 80 N. H. 500, 119 Atl. 332 (1922) ; cf. Texas & P. R.
Co. v. Gay, 88 Tex. 111, 30 S. W. 543 (1895). There is a split of authority on
the question of whether concealment of a cause of action, as in the principal
case, will have the effect of tolling a statute of limitations. That it will have
such effect: Bailey v. Glover, 88 U. S. 346, 22 L. ed. 636 (1874) (bill to set
aside fraudulent conveyances) ; American Tobacco Co. v. People's Tobacco Co,,
204 Fed. 58 (C. C. A. 5th, 1913) (an unlawful agreement to injure plaintiff's
business) ; Lightner Mining Co. v. Lane, 161 Cal. 689, 120 Pac. 771 (1912) (tres-
pass to land) ; Lieberman v. First National Bank of Wilmington, 18 Del. 416, 45
Atl. 901 (1900) (action on fidelity bond). That it will not: Murray v. Chicago
& N. W. R. Co., 92 Fed. 868 (C. C. A. 8th, 1899) (for freight rate discrimina-
tion) ; Hamilton v. Shepperd, 7 N. C. 115 (1819) (fraud in the sale of a land
warrant); Baines v. Williams, 25 N. C. 481 (1843) (conversion) ; Blount v.
Parker, 78 N. C. 128 (1878) ; cf. Engel v. Fischer, 102 N. Y. 400, 7 N. E. 300
(1886) (defendant concealed his person rather than the cause of action) ; Mc-
Bride v. Burlington, C. R. & N. R. Co., 97 Ia. 91, 66 N. W. 73 (1896).
' Contra: Wall v. Chesapeake & Ohio R. Co., 200 Ill. 66, 65 N. E. 632(1902); Chiles v. Drake, 2 Mete. 146, 74 Am. Dec. 406 (Ky. 1859).
'The.Harrisburg v. Rickards, 119 U. S. 199, 7 Sup. Ct. 140, 30 L. ed. 358(1886) ; Johnson v. Phoenix Bridge Co., 197 N. Y. 316, 90 N. E. 953 (1910) ;
Neely v. Minus, 196 N. C. 345, 145 S. E.-771 (1928); Note (1920) 8 A. L.
R. 145.
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However, the authorities are not in accord as to when the cause
of action accrues. It has been held that, since the right of action is
dependent upon the deceased's ability to sue, had he lived, no action
can be maintained for his death if the statute of limitations on his own
personal-injury action has run before his death.8 Other decisions,
under statutes providing that the action is to be conducted in his
name, have declared that the limitation will not run until the appoint-
ment of the personal representative, since until that time there was no
one who might maintain the action.9 But the majority view is that
the death is the cause of action,' 0 and the limitation must be computed
from that time."' This would seem the more reasonable construction.
It occasions no hardship, for even in the states where the action is
prosecuted by the personal representatives the beneficiaries are in a
position to compel his appointment.
8 Flynn v. N. Y., N. H. & H. R. Co., 283 U. S. 53, 51 Sup. Ct. 357, 75 L.
ed. 837 (1930) (action under Federal Employer's Liability Act) ; Howard v.
Bell Telephone Co. of Pa., 306 Pa. 518, 160 Atl. 613 (1932). Contra: Dameron
v. Southern R. Co., 44 Ga. App. 432, 161 S. E. 641 (1931). This question is
exhaustively treated in Note (1932) 80 U. OF PA. L. Ray. 993.
' Crapo v. City of Syracuse, 183 N. Y. 395, 76 N. E. 465 (1906) ; cf. Meekin
v. Brooklyn Heights R. Co., 164 N. Y. 145, 58 N. E. 50 (1900).
"o This statement, though found in many of the decisions, may be subject to
some qualifications. It has been held that a, release given, or judgment ob-
tained, by the deceased during his lifetime will preclude a recovery for wrong-
ful death. Strode v. St. Louis Transit Co., 197 Mo. 616, 95 S. W. 851 (1906)
(release) ; Edwards v. Interstate Chemical Co., 170 N. C. 551, 87 S. E. 635
(1915) ; Note (1927) 27 COL. L. Rav. 228; cf. Michigan Central R. Co. v. Vree-
land, 227 U. S. 59, 68, 33 Sup. Ct. 192, 57 L. ed. 417 (1912) ("This cause of
action was independent of any cause of action which the deceased had, and
includes no damages which he might have recovered for his injury if he had
survived. It is one beyond that which the decedent had-one proceeding upon
altogether different principles. It is liability for the loss and damage sustained
by the relatives dependent upon decedent. It is therefore a liability for the
pecuniary damage to them, and for that only.") ; Hartness v. Pharr, 133 N.
C. 566, 45 S. E. 901 (1903) ; Mitchell v. Talley, 182 N. C. 683, 109 S. E. 882
(1921). However, the administrator cannot be substituted as plaintiff in an
action commenced by the deceased, Harper v. Commissioners of Nash County,
123 N. C. 118, 31 S. E. 384 (1898), nor can this be done by amending the com-
plaint so as to make the action one for wrongful death, Bolick v. Railroad, 138
N. C. 370, 50 S. E. 689 (1905). It would seem more consistent to say that a
release or recovery by the deceased will not bar an action for wrongful death,
and a minority have so held: Mahoning Valley R. Co. v. Van Alstine, 77 Ohio
St. 395, 83 N. E. 601 (1908) (administrator's action under survival statute was
held not to bar a subsequent action for wrongful death) ; Schumacher, Rights of
Action Under Death and Survival Statutes (1924) 23 MicH. L. Rxv. 114.
' Louisville, E. & St. L. R. Co. v. Clarke, 152 U. S. 230, 14 Sup. Ct. 579,
38 L. ed. 442 (1894) (held also that the common-law "year and a day" rule
in murder cases does not apply); Taylor v. Cranberry Iron & Coal Co., 94
N. C. 525 (1886) ; Gulledge v. Seaboard Air Line R. Co., 147 N. C. 234, 60
S. E. 1134 (1908) (controversy over the administration will not extend the
time); (1927) 22 Ii. L. REv. 329.
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In holding the action under the death statute to be barred, the
court was clearly correct in the light of the North Carolina decisions.
There is, however, another question of some importance suggested by
the facts, but not discussed in the opinion. Can the plaintiff recover
for the alleged conspiracy? There is a statutory duty imposed upon
the coroner and the undertaker to record the death certificate, 12 and
at least a moral obligation to notify the relatives of the deceased, which
duties, it is alleged, have been neglected in pursuance of a conspiracy.
Furthermore, the plaintiff, or those whom he represents, have suffered
an injury as a result of such conduct. Although some courts have re-
fused their aid on the grounds that damages would be speculative,'8
there is a very respectable line of authority allowing an action for
fraud where, as a result of the defendant's fraudulent misrepresenta-
tions or concealment, the plaintiff has failed to prosecute some valid
cause of action before it has become barred by the statute of limita-
tions,14 or useless to him for some other reason. 15 This has been per-
mitted even where the lost right of action was one for wrongful
'N. C. CoDa AN N. (Michie, 1931) §§7094, 7096, and 7112 (4). Moreover,
the spouse or next of kin has a quasi property right in the body for the pur-
pose of giving it a proper burial, Finley v. Atlantic Transport Co., Ltd., 220
N. Y. 249, 115 N. E. 715 (1917), and a wrongful interference with this right,
or unlawful mutilation of the corpse, is actionable, Floyd v. Atlantic Coast
Line R. Co., 167 N. C. 55, 83 S. E. 12 (1914) (mutilation); Gadbury v. Bleitz,
133 Wash. 134, 233 P. 299 (1925) (undertaker holding body as security for
debt) ; cf. Nichols v. Central Vermont R. Co., 94 Vt. 14, 109 At. 905 (1919).
'Austin v. Barrows, 41 Conn. 287 (1874) ; Whitman v. Seaboard Air Line
R. Co., 107 S. C. 200, 92 S. E. 861 (1917) ; cf. Lomax v. Southwest Mo. Electric
R. Co., 106 Mo. App. 551, 81 S. W. 225 (1904) (An action cannot be main-
tained for fraud in inducing the plaintiff to execute a release for personal
injuries. Since the fraud vitiated the release, the original cause of action re-
mained in the plaintiff, and no damage has been suffered) ; Presnall v. McLeary,
50 S. W. 1066 (Tex. Civ. App. 1899).
UMarshall v. Buchanan, 35 Cal. 264, 95 Am. Dec. 95 (1868); Camm &
Hedges Co. v. Bank of Covelo, 275 Pac. 828 (Cal. App., 1929); Danielson v.
Bank of Scandinavia, 201 Wis. 392, 230 N. W. 83 (1930); cf. Tulloch v.
Haselo, 218 App. Div. 313, 218 N. Y. S. 139 (1926) (Dentist concealed negli-
gent acts until after statute of limitation had run on malpractice action. Held,
as the gravamen of the plaintiff's cause of action is malpractice, the action is
barred).
' Brown v. Castles, 11 Cush. 348 (Mass. 1853) ; O'Gorman v. Haber, 50 R.
I. 35, 147 Atl. 882 (1929) (creditor caused to refrain from attachment until
debtor could remove property from the state) ; cf. Garcia v. Fantauzzi, 20 F.
(2d) 524 (C. C. A., 1st, 1927); Sovereign Camp, W. 0. W. v. Feltman, 226
Ala. 390, 147 So. 396 (1933) (beneficiary allowed to sue for fraud in inducing
insured to surrender benefit certificate) ; Mlnazek v. Libera, 83 Minn. 288, 86
N. W. 100 (1901) ; Dulin v. Bailey, 172 N. C. 608, 90 S. E. 775 (1916) (Action
for spoliation of a will, which caused the probation of a former will, held,
plaintiff may maintain an action in tort against the wrongdoer without first
setting up the will for probate) commented upon (1917) 30 HA. L. REy. 527.
" Desmaris v. People's Gaslight Co., 79 N. H. 195, 107 Atl. 491 (1919).
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death.16 If the plaintiff can furnish clear proof that the former right
of action did exist,17 there would seem to be no unanswerable reason
why he should not find redress; and to hold otherwise would reward
the defendant for his own wrongdoing.
JOEL B. ADAms.
Evidence-Due Process-Right of the Accused to Accompany
Jury When It Views the Scene of the Crime.
In a recent case' the Supreme Court of the United States held
that due process under the 14th Amendment did not invalidate the
rule applied in Massachusetts whereby the defendant in a criminal
case is denied the right to accompany the jury when it takes a view of
the scene of the alleged crime. The majority opinion emphasized that
due process under the l4th Amendment dictates a fair result in each
case2 regardless of procedure. The minority argument that the
mandate is for a procedure which assures that the result, whatever
it may be, will be reached in a fair way3 seems the more logical in
view of the facts in the principal case.4
The exhaustive opinions leave little to be said on the due process
problem. Still the case affords an opportunity to collate the leading
decisions on views and to discuss the various problems coincident
thereto with especial reference to the North Carolina authorities. A
search indicates that this subject has not been gone into very thor-
oughly in recent years with the consequence that the authorities on
pertinent points are rather scattered.
The right to a view has a long historical background and is now
embodied in statutes in many jurisdictions. 5 The case of State v.
Perry establishes it as an inherent right within the discretion of the
1 Urtz v. N. Y. Central & H. R. R. Co., 202 N. Y. 170, 95 N. E. 711 (1911).
'Snyder v. Commonwealth of Massachusetts, 54 S. Ct. 330 (1934).2 The court assumed that defendant could not have spoken had he attended
the view, and that his right of cross-examination protected him to assure that
the correct place had been examined.
'Snyder v. Commonwealth of Massachusetts, supra note 1, at 344 (Proce-
dural due process has to do with the manner of the trial; dictates that in the
conduct of judicial inquiry certain fundamental rules of fairness be observed;
forbids the disregard of those rules; and is not satisfied if the result is just,
although the hearing was unfair).
'The recent case of Powell v. State of Alabama, 287 U. S. 45, 77 L. ed.
78, 53 S. Ct 55 (1932) wherein it was held that due process under the 14th
Amendment guaranteed a right to representation by counsel affords an inter-
esting comparison, both as to reasoning and result, to the principal case.
'MIss. CODE ANN. (1930) §2367; VA. CODE ANN. (Michie, 1930) §6013;
W. VA. CODE (1923) c..116 §30; see CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEnUR (Am. L.
Inst. 1926) (Proposed Final Draft) c. 14, §297 and c. 19, §329.
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judge in North Carolina.6 There is no statutory provision in this
State.7
Massachusetts and Minnesota are the only states which deny a
fundamental right in the defendant to accompany the jury.8 Other
states have reached the conclusion that he does not have to be present
usually by interpretation of two state constitutibnal provisions: the
right to be confronted by the witnesses9 and the right to be present
at the trial.'0
Apparently the question of the defendant's right to accompany
the jury has never been raised in this State. It seems that he ac-
companies them as a matter of course. Nor as a practical matter
should the question become pertinent."' However, should it be, the
cases leave the solution with regard to rights under the state consti-
tution somewhat speculative.
Under the confrontation provision the pertinent question is
whether or not the view constitutes evidence. The majority of the
cases indicate that it is.' 2  The North Carolina cases leave the
' State v. Perry, 121 N. C. 533, 27 S. E. 997 (1897) ; see State v. Gooch, 94
N. C. 897 (1886) (cited frequently as the first North Carolina view case but
apparently is not in point).
Y N. C CoDE ANN. (Michie, 1931) §573(3) providing for a compulsory ref-
erence when the case is one "which requires a personal view of the premises"
does not refer to a jury trial. Kelly v. Enterprise Lumber Co., 157 N. C. 175,
72 S. E. 957 (1911). For intimation contra: Long v. Byrd, 169 N. C. 658,
86 S. E. 574 (1915).
8Commonwealth v. Dascalakis, 246 Mass. 12, 140 N. E. 470 (1923); Com-
monwealth v. Belenski, 276 Mass. 35, 176 N. E. 501 (1931) ; Commonwealth
v. Snyder, 185 N. E. 376 (1933); State v. Rogers, 145 Minn. 303, 177 N. W.
358 (1920); 3 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE (1923) §1803 (Professor Wigmore ap-
parently agrees with this view).9 N. C. CoNsT. (1868) ART. I, §11.
Adopted by decision in North Carolina. State v. Crayton, 28 N. C. 164
(1845) ; State v. Thomas, 64 N. C. 74 (1870) ; State v. Kelly, 97 N. C. 404,
2 S. E. 185 (1887).
a Obviously as a usual thing there is no reason for denying the privilege.
The Massachusetts and Minnesota rulings seem arbitrary. The possibility of
mob violence might justify it [3 WIMORF, EVIDENCE (1923) §1803]. But
in such instance the defendant would rarely insist on the privilege. It seems
that the desperate character of the defendant might also justify denying him the
privilege.
'Freeman v. Commonwealth, 226 Ky. 850, 10 S. W. (2d) 827 (1928);
Watson v. State, 61 S. W. (2d) 476 (Tenn. 1933); Noell v. Commonwealth,
135 Va. 600, 619, 115 S. E. 679 (1923) ; State v. McCausland, 82 W. Va. 525,
96 S. E. 938 (1918). Contra: Close v. Samm, 27 Iowa 503 (1869); Chute v.
State, 19 Minn. 271 (1873) ; Yeager v. State, 137 Okla. 27, 278 Pac. 665 (1929).
The principal case argued it was immaterial that the view was called evidence.
See 2 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE (1923) §1168; (1929) 24 ILL. L. REV. 355. It
seems that a view by the jury for purposes of valuing land is always evi-
dence. (1900) 13 H~Av. L. R v. 692; (1907) 7 Cot,. L. REV. 432.
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matter in some doubt. Dicta in two cases indicate that it is evidence,18
and in two other cases actual evidence was taken at the view.14 Yet
the leading case on views in this state treats a view as a background
against which the jury may better apply the evidence introduced. 15
Consistency with this theory should demand that the view be taken
previously to the introduction of evidence, but in this case the view
was taken after the close of the evidence.
The privilege to be present at all stages of the trial raises the
question whether a view is a part of the trial. On this point the cases
split, one line holding the view a temporary discontinuance of the
trial,1' the other holding it an integral part of the trial.17 The North
Carolina cases leave the point in dispute, but they tend to indicate,
and one actually held,' 8 that it is a part of the trial. Since the right
to be present is so zealously guarded in this State as to include pre-
liminary matters like examination of the jury,' 9 it would seem by
analogy that Nort- Carolina would hold the view a part of the trial
for this purpose.
Assuming the privilege of accompanying the jury to exist, may it
be waived? Here again the cases are not in accord, and the methods
whereby it may be waived vary.20 Should the view be considered a
part of the trial in North Carolina, which seems the more probable
holding, the principles applied in this State with regard to waiver of
presence in misdemeanors, felonies, and capital felonies would con-
trol.21 Can the court compel the defendant to go with the jury?
" Hampton v. Norfolk and Western R. Co., 120 N. C. 534, 543, 27 S. E. 96
(1897) ; State v. Jones, 175 N. C. 709, 95 S. E. 576 (1918).
a, State v. Stewart, 189 N. C. 340, 127 S. E. 260 (1925) ; State v. Lawrence,
196 N. C. 562, 146 S. E. 395 (1928).
" State v. Perry, &upra note 6.
"5 People v. Thorne, 156 N. Y. 286, 50 N. E. 947 (1898) ; State v. Rogers,
.upra note 8; cf. State v. Hilsinger, 167 Wash. 427, 9 P(2d) 357 (1932).
Benton v. State, 30 Ark. 328, 350 (1875) ; Noell v. Commonwealth; State
v. McCausland, both supra note 12.
" State v. Stewart, supra note 14, (holding that a view did not -constitute a
violation of a statute providing "A Superior Court shall be held by a judge
thereof at the courthouse in each county." [N. C. CODE ANN. (Michie, 1931)
§1443].
"State v. Dry, 152 N. C. 813, 67 S. E. 1000 (1910).0By express waiver: Kanner v. U. S., 34 F. (2d) 863 (C. C. A. 7th, 1929);
People v. Thorne, supra note 16. By failure to ask permission; People v.
White, 30 Cal. App. 156, 128 Pac. 417 (1912); cf. Chance v. State, 156 Ga.
428, 119 S. E. 303 (1923). Contra: Freeman v. Commonwealth; State v.
McCausland, both supra note 12; see Carney v. Commonwealth, 181 Ky. 443,
205 S. W. 408 (1918).
" State v. Jenkins, 84 N. C. 813 (1881) ; State v. Dry, supra note 19; State
v. Matthews, 191 N. C. 378, 131 S. E. 743 (1926).
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Apparently it coul4 if presence were held not waivable. But there
have been holdings to the contrary.22
The cases indicate that views have been used relatively infre-
quently in North Carolina.23 The earlier decisions raised the objec-
tion that opportunities for irregularities were increased under such
circumstances.2 4 Other objections go to the fact that the premises
may have changed since the crime. This is a weighty argument today
since crowded dockets may postpone the trial and since the best evi-
dence in many instances would be a photograph.25 Another objection,
frequently raised, is that a view, regardless of what it is called,
amounts to evidence 26 and therefore the record on appeal is impaired.
However, today the limitations naturally attendant upon the record
are fully recognized, and so this objection seems entitled to little
weight.
JoE EAGLES.
Jurisdiction-Assignee for Collection-Use of the Trust
Device to Gain Access to the Federal Courts.
A bond issue of a Texas municipality was in the hands of a large
number of persons, all of whom were citizens of states other than
Texas, but no one of whose holdings equalled $3,000. These holders,
under a bondholders's protective agreement "sold, assigned and trans-
ferred" all their "right, title and interest" in the bonds to the plain-
tiffs, who constituted a committee of the bondholders. No consider-
ation passed from the plaintiffs to the prior holders. By the terms
of the agreement, the committee was authorized to collect all moneys
due on the bonds; borrow money and pledge the bonds as security
therefor; and to conduct litigation thereon if necessary. The District
court denied jurisdiction on the ground that plaintiffs were mere
agents for collection. On appeal, reversed. Held, the jurisdictional
amount was present, since the agreement constituted a valid transfer,
- State v: Mortenson, 26 Utah 312, 75 P. 562 (1903) (advancing the novel
theory that compelling defendant to accompany the jury would violate the
privilege not to testify against himself since the mien and reactions oi the
defendant at the scene of the crime would be evident to the jury).
3Jenkins v. Wilmington and Weldon R. Co., 110 N. C. 438, 15 S. E. 193
(1892) ; Brown v. Southern Railway Co., 165 N. C. 392, 81 S. E. 450 (1914).
These appear to be the only North Carolina cases not elsewhere cited in this
note wherein a view was mentioned.
Hampton v. Norfolk and Western R. Co., supra note 13.
'-For a discussion of photographs as evidence in North Carolina, State v.
Matthews, supra note 21; (1929) 7 N. C. L. Rev. 443.
' Snyder v. Commonwealth of Massachusetts, supra note 1; Close v. Satnm,
supra note 12; 2 WIGMo E, EVIDENCE (1923) §1168; (1930) 24 I1. L. R. 355.
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the plaintiffs holding title to the bonds as trustees of an express
trust.1
Even though diversity of citizenship is present, an assignor cannot
avoid the objection that his claim is below the jurisdictional amount
of $3,000 by assigning his claim, if the assignment or transfer is
made merely for the purpose of collection. The assignor, it is said,
remains the beneficial owner and real party in interest, while the
assignee is merely an agent for collection.2 However, if such an
assignment is absolute and the assignor parts with all his interest in
the assigned claims, the action may be maintained by the assignee on
the aggregated claim even if the assignment is expressly made for the
purpose of collection, 3 since if the assignment is absolute, the motive
which induced it in no way affects the right of the assignee.4
The assignment in the principal case would seem to fall within
the first mentioned rule, since the agreement, while expressly trans-
ferring title in the bonds to the plaintiff, indicates that the real pur-
pose of the transfer was to enable the plaintiffs, who could meet the
requirement as to jurisdictional amount, to sue and collect thereon.5
This view is further supported by the fact that no consideration passed
from the plaintiffs to the original holders for the bonds.6 The trans-
action would also seem colorable in view of the fact that if the real title
were transferred to the plaintiffs to enable them to maintain the suit,
'Bullard v. City of Cisco, Texas, 54 S. Ct. 177 (1933).
'Waite v. Santa Cruz, 184 U. S. 302, 22 S. Ct. 327, 46 L. Ed. 552 (1902);
18 STAT. 470, 472 (1875) 28 U. S. C. A. 80 (1926) ("If in any suit com-
menced in a District court . . . it shall appear to the satisfaction of said
court... that such suit does not really and substantially involve a dispute...
properly within the jurisdiction of said District court, or that the parties
have been improperly made or joined ... for the purpose of creating a case
cognizable ... [in such court] ... said District court shall proceed no further
therein, but shall dismiss the suit or remand it, as justice may require . .
DODiE, FEDERAL PROCEDURE (1928) §58.
' O'Neill v. Wolcott Mining Co., 174 Fed. 527 (C. C. A. 8th, 1909); Ky.
Wagon Mfg. Co. v. Jones & Hopkins Mfg. Co., 248 Fed. 272 (C. C. A. 5th,
1918).
"Kreider v. Cole, 149 Fed. 647 (C. C. A. 3rd, 1907); O'Neill v. Wolcott
Mining Co., supra note 3.
'Williams v. Nottawa, 104 U. S. 209, 26 L. Ed. 719 (1881) ; Woodside v.
Beckham, 216 U. S. 117, 30 S. Ct. 367, 54 L. Ed. 408 (1910) ; Mutual Adjust-
ment Co. v. Pac. Telephone & Telegraph Co., 288 Fed. 198 (W. D. Wash.
1923). These are all cases in which the claims were admittedly assigned 'to
the plaintiff for collection and were dismissed for want of jurisdiction. The
agreement in the principal case seems to effect the same purpose, the difference
being that in the principal case the plaintiffs did not allege that the assign-
ment was made for collection, but in fact, insisted that it was not.
'Farmington v. Pillsbury, 114 U. S. 138, 5 S. Ct. 807, 29 L. Ed. 114 (1885);
Woodside v. Beckham, rupra note 5; Fountain v. Town of Angelica, 12 Fed. &(N. D. N. Y. 1882).
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further stipulations as to what could be done with the bonds by the
plaintiffs would have been unnecessary.7 The court, however, calls the
plaintiffs trustees and thus offers a means of avoiding the effect of
the above rule as set out in its former decisions,8 since assignors need
only to phrase their transaction in a fashion similar to the agreement
in the principal case, which in effect accomplishes the same purposes
of an agency for collection.
If suits brought by assignees for collection should be prohibited,
the effect of this decision is bad for the reasons mentioned. It is
submitted, however, that if the requisite diversity of citizenship exists,
the purposes of federal jurisdiction will be better served by the effect
of this decision, since small bondholders, into whose hands bonds
from the same issue have fallen, should be permitted to sue on such
bonds in the federal courts. This is supported by the reasons that
led to the creation of federal courts,9 and is especially desirable in
view of the recent movement toward making the federal court "a
"The agreement in the principal case contained further provisions that "the
committeg (plaintiffs) may ...take or participate in, or settle, compromise
or discontinue any action for the collection of any of the bonds . . . or the
protection, enforcement or foreclosure of any legal or equitable lien securing
same . . . The committee may give such directions, execute such papers and
do such acts as the committee may consider wise in order to preserve or en-
force the rights ... or serve the interests of the depositors (prior holders)."
It was also provided that the agreement should not remain in force for longer
than five years unless extended as authorized in the agreement; that the com-
mittee might terminate the agreement at any time by giving notice to the prior
holders; and as regards the proceeds realized on the bonds, it was stipulated
that upon the termination of the agreement, the securities, cash and property
held by the committee were to be distributed among the prior holders according
to the amount of their deposited bonds, provided each holder pay his share of
all expenses and indebtedness incurred by the committee.
0 Supra notes 2 and 5.
' See J. J. Parker, The Federal Jurisdiction and Recent Attacks Upon It
(1932) 18 A. B. A. J. 433 at 437 ("one of the principal arguments in favor of
federal jurisdiction ... is that its existence is essential to furnish the non-
resident an impartial tribunal in which his controversy may be tried. I do
not believe that federal judges are men of higher character than state judges,
or that jurors in federal courts are more intelligent or more impartial as a
general proposition. But there is this difference: the state trial judge is gen-
erally a local man with a local outlook. The federal trial judge has jurisdiction
over a wide territory; his action is subject to review as of right by a court
having jurisdiction over a number of states. The jury in the state court comes
from the county of the resident party; the federal jury is drawn from a
wide territory and usually knows no more about the plaintiff and his attorney
than about the defendant and his attorney") ; Howland, Shall Federal Jurisdic-
tion of Controversies Between Citizens of Different States Be Presfrved (1932)
18 A. B. A. J. 499 at 501 ("If bias and prejudice has vanished as between states,
it would seem that it must have vanished as between counties in the same
state. Nevertheless, the statutes are still in force carefully guarding the rights
of citizens against bias and prejudice between counties and districts in the same
state.")
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rich man's court" by increasing the jurisdictional amount.10 The
present ruling moreover, would seem to save litigants money by
avoiding a multiplicity of suits. On the other hand, it might be
answered that the same purpose could be accomplished by the plain-
tiffs' resort to representative suits in a state court, or defendants'
resort to a bill of peace. In any event, the instant case does have the
decided advantage of enabling small scattered bondholders to place
their investment into hands where it can best be managed, and the
assignment statute still exists to safeguard the federal courts from
other kinds of suits based on aggregated claims."-
E. D. KUYKENDALL, JR.
Landlord and Tenant-Leases--Removal of Trade Fixtures.
An original lease provided that the tenant would be allowed to
remove at the termination of the lease any trade fixtures he might,
place on the premises. Before the term had expired a new lease was
entered into for a second term. No provision was inserted in the
second lease giving the tenant the right to remove trade fixtures placed
on the premises during the first term. The case went to the Supreme
Court on the validity of a permanent injunction restraining the tenant
from removing the fixtures which had been annexed to the premises
during the original term. Held, error in not continuing the tem-
porary restraining order to the hearing. The Supreme Court seemed
to take the view that the tenant's right to remove the fixtures was not
lost by his failing to provide for their removal in the second lease, es-
pecially if the tenant could show that such was the intention of the
parties.'
By early common law that which was affixed to the realty became
a part of the realty.2 Thus, if a tenant annexed a chattel, regardless
of its character, to the realty his title thereto was forever abandoned
to the landlord unless he had expressly contracted in his lease for
the right to remove. The patent inequities of this rule gradually
o Note (1933) 31 MicH. L. REv. 59 at 71.
1 STAT. 76 (1789) 28 U. S. C. A. 41(1) (1926) ("... No District court
shall have cognizance of any suit [except upon foreign bills of exchange] to
recover upon any promissory note or other chose in action in favor of any
assignee, . .. unless such suit might have been prosecuted in such court
if no assignment had been made.").
ISprings v. Atlantic Refining Co., 205 N. C. 444, 171 S. E. 635 (1933).
2See Lord Mansfield in Lawton v. Salmon, East. 22 Geo. 3, B. R., 1 H.
Bl. 259 (1789) ("All the old cases agree that whatever is connected with the
freehold, even though put up by the tenant, belongs to the heir.").
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impressed the judges, so that by the middle of the eighteenth century
an exception was being universally recognized in the case of trade
fixtures.8 The courts began to allow these to be removed as a matter
of right even though there was no express provision for their removal
contained in the lease. This right, however, was strictly construed,
most courts holding that the chattels had to be removed before the
landlord's right to the premises accrued, and that any chattels remain-
ing on that date were lost to the tenant.4 A few courts softened this
rule to permit the tenant to remove within a reasonable time after his
right to the premises had expired.5
This remains the law today, the problem becoming vital at the
point where the lease terminates before the tenant has removed the
fixtures. Three possible situations might arise with varying results.
First, the tenant might unqualifiedly relinquish possession to the
landlord at the expiration of his term. In this case it is a well settled
rule of law that the fixtures become the absolute property of the land-
lord.0 Of course the tenant may by contract reserve the right to
remove for a given length of time following his term, but we are not
here concerned with such a situation.
Second, the tenant might remain in possession after his term ex-
pires without executing a new lease. In this situation it would seem
to follow that the chattels, not having been removed before the termi-
nation of the lease, the title thereto vested immediately in the landlord,
and the tenant had lost his right of removal. The courts, however,
seem to view such retention of possession as a sort of continuation of'
the original lease, the tenant retaining in effect the rights he had
thereunder, and hold that the tenant retains his right to remove so
long as he remains in possession7
'Ibid. ("But there has been a relaxation of the strict rule for the benefit of
trade, and many things may now be taken away which could not be formerly,
such as erections for carrying on any trade.")
' Stoke v. Upton, 40 Mich. 581, 29 Am. Rep. 560 (1879); Blake-McFall
Co. v. Wilson, 98 Ore. 626, 193 Pac. 902 (1920); Poole's Case, 1 Salk. 368,
91 Eng. Rep. 320 (1704) ; Lyde v. Russell, 1 B. & Ad. 394, 109 Eng. Rep. 834-
(1830). Contra: Pemberton v. King, 13 N. C. 376 (1828) ("If the removal is
made after the expiration of the term, the tenant is, in respect to his entry,
only a trespasser").
r Shellar v. Shivers, 171 Pa. 569, 33 Atl. 95 (1895) ; Preston v. Briggs, 16
Vt. 124 (1844) ; Gartland v. Hickman, 56 W. Va. 75, 48 S. E. 14 (1904).
'Beers v. St. John, 16 Conn. 322 (1844); McCracken v. Hall, 7 Ind. 30
(1855) ; Carlin v. Ritter, 68 Md. 478, 6 Am. St. Rep. 467 (1888) ; Shepard v.
Spaulding, 4 Met. 416 (Mass. 1842); Bickwith v. Boyce, 9 Mo. 560 (1845);
The State v. Elliott, 11 N. H. 540 (1841); Radey v. McCurdy, 209 Pa. 306,
58 Atl. 558 (1904).Sampson v. Camperdown Cotton Mills, 64 Fed. 939 (C. S. C. 1894) ; Woods.
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Third, the tenant might continue in possession but execute a new
lease. It is in this situation that litigation arises most frequently.
According to the supposed majority rule, the tenant's right to remove
the chattels terminates with his original lease, regardless of whether
or not such lease contained a provision permitting removal during
the term.8 This rule is followed even though the tenant executed the
new lease before his first term ran out. Unless the new lease specifi-
cally provides that the chattels annexed during the former term may
be removed by the tenant during this succeeding term, these courts
will refuse to let the tenant thereafter remove such fixtures. This,
on the theory that the acceptance of the new lease was an effectual sur-
render of the old, together with the estate and all other rights which
the old lease secured to him.
On the other hand, more liberal courts consider this situation in
which the tenant's possession is undisturbed-the only change being
the new lease by which he acquires right to possession-as analogous
to the second situation above described; and they hold that the tenant,
despite the absence of any express stipulation to that effect in the
new lease, may remove during the new term any trade fixtures he
may have put on the land during the first term.9 Of course, he may
during his second term remove any chattels annexed during that
term. The rule declaring against removal is generally described as the
majority rule in this third situation, but an exhaustive search of the
cases leads one to believe that more jurisdictions actually follow the
rule favoring the tenant.1 0
v. Haywards Bank, 10 Cal. App. 93, 106 Pac. 730 (1909) ; Fenimore v. White,
78 Neb. 520, 111 N. W. 204 (1907) ; Lewis v. Ocean Nay., etc., Co., 125 N. Y.
341, 26 N. E. 301 (1891); Darrah v. Baird, 101 Pa. 265 (1882); Weeton v.
Woodcock, 7 M. & W. 13, 151 Eng. Rep. 659 (1840) ("The rule to be collected
from the several cases decided on this subject seems to be this, that the
tenant's right to remove fixtures continues during his original term, and during
srch further period of possession by him, as he holds the premises under a
right still to consider himself- as tenant").
8 Merritt v. Judd, 14 Cal. 59 (1859) ; Chicago Sanitary Dist. v. Cook, 169
Ill. 184, 48 N. E. 461 (1897) ; Heddrich v. Smith, 103 Ind. 203, 53 Am. St. Rep.
509 (1885) ; Carlin v. Ritter, supra note 6; Watriss v. First Nat'l Bank, 124
Mass. 571, 26 Am. Rep. 694 (1878) ; Gilbert v. Sons of Abraham, 59 N. J. L.
160, 35 Atl 1121. (1896); Loughran v. Ross, 45 N. Y. 792, 6 Am. Rep. 173(1871).
*Bergh v. Herring-Hall-Marvin Safe Co., 136 Fed. 368 (C. C. A. 2d.,
1905) ; Zeppar v. Reppy, 15 Col6. 260, 25 Pac. 164 (1890) ; Daly v. Simonson,
126 Iowa 716, 102 N. W. 780 (1905) ; Thomas v. Gayle, 134 Ky. 330, 120
S. W. 20 (1909) ; Kerr v. Kingsbury, 39 Mich. 150, 33 Am. Rep. 362 (1878) ;
Sassen v. Haegle, 125 Minn. 441, 147 N. W. 445 (1914) ; Red Diamond Cloth-
ing Co. v. Steidmann, 82 Neb. 302, 117 N. W. 714 (1908) ; Radey v. McCurdy,
supra note 6; Shields v. Hansen, 201 Wis. 349, 230 N. W. 51 (1930).1a Supra note 8 for authorities supporting so-called "majority" view. Supra
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To the writer it seems that the most equitable results are arrived
at by those courts which take into consideration the terms of the new
lease.1 If it is substantially the same as the old, it is generally con-
sidered as a continuation thereof, and the tenant's right to remove
the fixtures is by implication incorporated into the terms of the new
lease. But if the new lease is upon new terms, and new conditions are
inserted therein, the tenant forfeits the fixtures to the landlord unless
he specifically reserves the right of removal.
In the principal case the North Carolina Court had before it for
the first time this particular problem involving removal of trade
fixtures. The court, in holding that the tenant should not lose his
riglft of removal under such circumstances, was lining up with the
"minority" view; but from any view point it would appear that the
rule favoring the tenant is not only the more equitable, but is also
expressive of a policy tending to encourage trade.
J. CARLYLE RUTLEDGE.
Negotiable Instruments--Effect of Provision for Interest
on Unpaid Interest Payments.
The plaintiff, in a federal district court of Pennsylvania, seeks to
recover as a holder in due course of six promissory notes executed
and delivered in Florida. Each contained these provisions: "with
interest thereon at 7 per cent per annum from date until fully paid.
Interest payable semi-annually . . . Deferred interest payments to
bear interest from maturity at 10 per cent per annum payable semi-
annually." Held: The notes are non-negotiable because the amounts
note 9 for authorities supporting so-called "minority" view.
"Ross v. Campbell, 9 Colo. App. 38, 47 Pac. 465 (1896) (A new lease
entered into as the most convenient method of extending the then existing term.
Held, it was not such a termination of the lease as to bar the tenant's right
to afterwards remove fixtures already annexed by him) ; Baker v. McClurg,
198 Ill. 28, 64 N. E. 701 (1902) (New lease a reiteration of the former lease
except that it gave permission to the lessee to assign the lease. Held, tenant did
not forfeit his right to remove trade fixtures placed on the premises under
the original lease) ; Hedderich v. Smith, siupra note 8 (The rent reserved for
the new term was different from the old; tenant covenanted to repair and
surrender the premises at the end of the term without waste. Held, tenant
was in as of a new estate, which must be measured by the condition of things
existing when it commenced; nQ reservation having been made in the new
lease, the tenant lost all rights to the fixtures) ; Carlin v. Ritter, Mupra note 6
(New lease was the first written lease; it was not to effect an extension upon
the terms of the existing lease, but to create a new tenancy upon new and
different terms. Held, trade fixtures placed on the premises prior to the new
lease became the property of the landlord upon the tenant's entering upon the
new tenancy without reserving his rights in the fixtures).
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are uncertain and the plaintiff, therefore, is not a holder in due
course.
1
Although asserting its right to construe the Uniform Negotiable
Instruments Law unbound by local interpretation, the court-in
absence of direct federal authority--did rely upon two state decisions. 2
In these two cases the New Jersey and Pennsylvania courts held
somewhat similar notes to be non-negotiable. Provisions for one
rate of interest "until fully paid" and for a higher rate on "deferred
payments" were construed as irreconcilable in application to the prin-
cipal, thereby rendering the amount uncertain. The Pennsylvania
court intimates that had one rate of interest run until maturity instead
of until "fully paid"--thereby eliminating the ambiguity-the notes
would have been negotiable. But in still another case the New
York court, declaring identical notes to be negotiable, construed
"deferred payments" to refer only to unpaid interest, holding that the
higher rate of interest on overdue interest payments was a readily
ascertainable and therefore certain sum.8
The draftsmanship in the principal case is more skilful. Am-
biguity is avoided by the insertion in the notes of the word "interest"
in relation to "deferred payments". The court, however, ignores the
New York holding and blindly applies the result reached in- the Penn-
sylvania and New Jersey cases, which are not authorities on the point
involved.
To hold a note non-negotiable because of an ambiguity in the rate
of interest would not be new to the federal court,4 though un-
politic if the amount could reasonably be construed as certain.5 But
to hold that a provision for interest on interest due before maturity
of the principal renders the amount uncertain, is contrary not only
to what little authority there is on the point O but also to the con-
struction placed on "sum certain" under the law merchant and the
Uniform Negotiable Instruments Law.1
'Burns Mortg. Co. Inc. v. Fried, 67 F. (2d) 352, (C. C. A. 3rd, 1933).
'New Miami Shores Corp. v. Duggan, 9 N. J. Misc. R. 620, 155 Atl. 262
(1931) approved in (1932) 17 IA. L. REv. 408; First Nat. Bank of Miami v.
Bosler, 297 Pa. 353, 147 Ati. 74 (1929).
"Lessen v. Lindsey, 238 App. Div. 262, 264 N. Y. Supp. 391 (1933).
' Ashcraft v. Bream, 2 F. Supp. 344 (E. D. Pa., 1932).
'Lessen v. Lindsey, supra note 3.
'Brown v. Vossen, 112 Mo. App. 676, 87 S. W. 577 (1905) ; Lessen v. Lind-
sey, supra note 3; Continental & Commercial Nat. Bank of Chicago v. Jefferson,
51 S. D. 477, 215 N. W. 533 (1927) ; Baker v. Sartori, 66 Wash. 260, 119 P. 611(1911).TNotes (1919) 2A.L. R. 139; (1927) 51 A. L. R. 294; (1929) 58 A. L. P,
1281.
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It has been held by the majority of courts that the sum payable is
a "sum certain", under section 1, subsection 2 of the Negotiable
Instruments Law, despite provisions for: (1) interest on unpaid in-
terest coupons ;8 (2) interest on interest coming due and unpaid upon
maturity of principal ;9 (3) Increased interest on principal from ma-
turity; 1°O (4) increased interest from date if principal is unpaid at
maturity ;11 (5) conditions precedent to payment of interest on cer-
tificates of deposit;12 (6) payment of interest at stipulated periods
before maturity.13
Amidon, J., in Cudahy Packing C. v. State Nat. Bank,14 clearly
expresses the attitude of most courts on this question: "The rule
requiring commercial certainty in commercial paper was a rule of com-
merce before it was a rule of law. It requires commercial, not
mathematical, certainty. An uncertainty which does not impair the
functions of negotiable instruments in the eyes of business men ought
not to be regarded by the courts."
An insistence upon literal interpretation of the Negotiable In-
struments Law can easily make it a barrier to commercial progress,
thereby defeating its very purpose.15 In the principal case, unfortu-
nately, the literal test is applied to what is a commercially certain
sum. Without reference to more extrinsic evidence than is required
in notes calling for payments of interest before maturity, the courts
could easily ascertain the defaults in interest payments and compute
interest thereon.
The holding is particularly unfortunate in that it may establish
a precedent for all federal courts, if the doctrine of Swift v. Tyson 6
I Gelpecke v. Dubuque, 1 Wall. 175, 17 L. ed. 520 (U. S. 1864) ; De Hass v.
Roberts, 70 Fed. 227 (C. C. A. 3rd, 1895).
'Fox.v. Crane, 43 Cal. App. 559, 185 Pac. 415 (1919) ; Gilmore v. Hirst,
56 Kan. 626, 44 Pac. 603 (1896) ; Cherry v. Sprague, 187 Mass. 113, 72 N. E.
456 (1904) ; Lister v. Donlan, 81 Mont. 571, 281 Pac. 348 (1929) ; Sharpe v.
Schoenberger, 44 S. D. 402, 184 N. W. 209 (1921).
10 Chicago Railway Equipment Co. v. Merchants Nat. Bank, 136 U. S. 268,
10 Sup. Ct. 999, 34 L. ed. 349 (1890) ; Lister v. Donlan, supra note 9; Citizen's
Savings Bank of Columbus v. Landis, 37 OkI. 530, 132 Pac. 1101 (1913) ; Sharpe
v. Schoenberger, supra note 9.
n Farm Mortgage & Loan Co. v. Martin, 51 S. D. 421, 214 N. W. 816
(1927); Union Nat. Bank of Massillon v. Mayfield, 71 Okl. 22, 174 Pac.
1034 (1918).
"Hatch v. First Nat. Bank, 94 Me. 348, 47 Atl. 908 (1900); White v.
Wadhams, 204 Mich. 381, 170 N. W. 60 (1918).
"Commercial Nat. Bank v. Consumers Brewing Co., 16 App. D. C. 186
(1900) ; Taylor v. American Bank, 63 Fla. 631, 57 So. 678 (1912).
- 134 Fed. 538, 541 (C. C. A. 8th, 1904).
Beutel, Negotiability by Contract (1933) 28 ILL. L. REv. 205.
"16 Pet. 1, 10 L. ed. 865 (U. S. 1842).
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is to be interpreted as enabling federal courts to construe uniform
state statutes declaratory of the common law independent of local
precedents. 17
W. V. SHEPHERD.
Usury-Affirmative Relief foy the Debtor.
The defendant procured a .loan of $4,000 from an investment
company. He executed a deed of trust on Blackacre to X to secure
payment of one long term note for $4,000 and eight short term first
mortgage notes of $60 each. All were made to the investment com-
pany. On the long term note interest was at 6% and began two years
after date, while the short term notes bore no interest until maturity.
After $1,426 had been paid, the plaintiff bought the land under a fore-
closure sale. In an action brought to eject the defendant, he set up a
counterclaim in which he demanded a forfeiture of all interest on the
grounds that the notes were usurious. Held, Because the defendant
had not paid the principal and legal interest, it was proper to dismiss
the counterclaim. 1
Statutes pertaining to usury are designed to discourage the making
of usurious loans no matter what the form of the transaction may be.2
Following this principle it has been held that a debtor may set up
the defense of usury where he has been forced by the creditor to sub-
scribe to an endowment life insurance policy,8 to pay the plaintiff's
attorney's fees, 4 and to sign as surety on another note held by the
creditor. 5 It has also been held that usury is a valid defense to a note
in the hands of a purchaser before maturity without notice.6 In
short, it seems that the court is ever ready to inflict a penalty upon
one who attempts to extract more than 6% interest. In contrast with
"'Fordham, The Federal Courts, and the Construction of Uniform State
Laws, (1929) 7 N. C. L. REv. 423.
:'North Carolina Mortgage Corp. v. Wilson, 205 N. C. 493, 171 S. E.
783 (1933) (The result was also supported on the grounds that a counterclaim
to recover usurious interest is improper in an action to recover possession of
land).
2 Ripple v. Mortgage & Acceptance Co., 193 N. C. 422, 137 S. E. 156 (1927);
Pratt v. American Bond & Mortgage Co., 196 N. C. 294, 146 S. E. 135 (1928).
8 Carter v. Life Insurance Co. of Va., 122 N. C. 338, 30 S. E. 341 (1898).
'Williams v. Rich, 117 N. C. 235, 23 S. E. 257 (1895).
Windor Nat. Bank v. Graham, 38 Ga. App. 552, 144 S. E. 357 (1928).
Faison v. Grandy, 126 N. C. 827, 36 S. E. 276 (1900) (Modified for another
reason in 128 N. C. 438, 38 S. E. 897 (1901) ; Federal Reserve Bank of Rich-
mond v. Jones, 205 N. C. 698, 172 S. E. 185 (1934) ; cf. Cox v. Harrison, 172
S. E. 417 (S. C. 1934) (defense of usury is not available in an action to fore-
close a chattel mortgage).
THE NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
this strict policy there exists a situation in North Carolina by which
a creditor may collect legal interest on a usurious loan and thus evade
the penalty prescribed by the statute. Under the equitable maxim of
"he who seeks equity must do equity", a debtor is entitled to no affirm-
ative relief until he has tendered payment of the principal and legal
interest.7 A creditor may be able to collect the usurious interest by
threatening foreclosure of collateral security. It is true that if he does,
the debtor can recover twice the amount of interest,8 provided the
action is brought within two years.9 Thus, it may be seen that an
application of the equitable maxim does not injure a debtor if he takes
due advantage of his legal remedies. It is to be regretted, however,
that such incompatible policies exist within one state.
Iistorically there seems no justification for the inconsistency.
Until 1866 a usurious contract was totally void.10 It was in order
to avoid the effect of such a severe penalty that a rule was developed
holding the statute inapplicable when the debtor sought affirmative
relief."1 The act of 186612 reduced the penalty to a loss of interest.
It also provided that this penalty applied whether the action was "at
law or in equity". Justice Clark, in an excellent dissent,'8 has pointed
out that it was not until the old line of cases had been followed that
the attention of the court was called to the fact that this act was
apparently intended to alter the rule that to entitle a debtor to affirma-
tive relief he must pay legal interest. The acts of 1876-77' 4 and of
189515 contained the provision that the charging of a usurious rate
caused a forfeiture of all interest. If the obligation were usurious,
there is no legal interest under these statutes.16 By this time, how-
ever, the old rule was too well established to be abrogated although
several attempts were made to do so. 1 7
' Waters v. Garris, 188 N. C. 305, 124 S. E. 334 (1924) ; Jonas v. Home
Mortgage Co., 205 N. C. 89, 170 S. E. 127 (1933).
I Sloan v. Piedmont Fire Insurance Co., 189 N. C. 690, 128 S. E. 2 (1925);
N. C. Coa ANN. (Michie, 1931) §2306.
'Sloan v. Piedmont Fire Insurance Co,, supra note 8; N. C. CODE ANN.
(Michie, 1931) §442 (2).
" N. C. Laws 1741, c. 28.
"Taylor v. Smith, 9 N. C. 465 (1823); Ballinger v. Edwards, 39 N. C.
449 (1847).
'N. C. Laws 1865-66, c. 24.
Churchill v. Turnage, 122 N. C. 426, 30 S. E. 122 (1898).
"N. C. Laws 1876-77, c. 91.
"N. C. Laws 1895, c. 69.
See Churchill v. Turnage, supra note 13 (dissent).
"Ward v. Sugg, 113 N. C. 489, 18 S. E. 717 (1893) ; see Moore v. Beaman,
112 N. C. 558, 564, 17 S. E. 676 (1893); Churchill v. Turnage, supra note 13
(dissent) ; Owens v. Wright, 161 N. C. 127, 76 S. E. 735 (1912) (dissent);
Corey v. Hooker, 171 N. C. 229, 88 S. E. 236 (1916) (dissent).
NOTES AND COMMENTS
The maxim of "he who seeks equity must do equity" has been
applied in other states to effect the same result as is reached in North
Carolina. In New York,18 Alabama,' 9 and Virginia2 ° the rule has
been changed by statute so as to relieve the debtor from having to
pay interest on a usurious loan under any conditions. In Minnesota,21
Texas',22 and Florida23 the same result has been reached by judicial
interpretation. The Supreme Court of Idaho, under a statute almost
identical with ours, has held that the debtor need tender no interest
when he invokes the assistance of a court of equity.24
As has been stated, the law in North Carolina on the subject ap-
pears to be settled. Were it not so, a different interpretation might
be placed upon the present st.tute. Because it is hardly likely to be
done, however, it is submitted that Section 2306 of the Code be
amended by inserting this provision. "Nor shall any court require or
compel the payment or deposit of any interest as a condition of grant-
ing affirmative relief to the borrower in any case of usurious loans
forbidden by this section."
EmmETr C. WILLIs, JP.
Property-Effect of Condition That Grantor Convey Title
Free from Encumbrances.
A contract for the sale of land required the vendor to deposit in
escrow by a certain date a deed and abstract showing title in the ven-
dor free and clear of all Encumbrances. There was in fact an out-
standing sheriffs' certificate of sale of part of the property, which was
bought in by the vendee before the date stipulated for performance.
Held, in a claim in bankruptcy by the vendor for the escrow funds,
that the vendor was not thereby relieved from performance of the
N. Y. CoN. LAws, (Cahill, 1930) §377.I Reynolds v. Lee, 180 Ala. 76, 60 So. 101 (1912) ; ALA. CODE ANN. (Michie,
1928) §8567.
'Rockdeschall v. Seibel, 126 Va. 359, 101 S. E. 425 (1919); VA. Co E
ANN. (Michie, 1930) §5554.
Travernicht v. Kingston, 156 Minn. 442, 195 N. W. 278 (1923).
Yonack v. Emery, 4 S. W. (2d) 293 (Tex. Civ. App. 1928) (The court
without comment accepted the fact that a tender of the principal was sufficient).
" Mortgage Securities Corp. v. Levy, 11 F. (2d) 270 (C. C. A. 5th 1926) ;
Robbins v. Blanc, 105 Fla. 625, 142 So. 223, 225 (1932) ("He who seeks equity
must do equity, so it is an essential part of a bill to redeem a mortgage that it
offer in express terms to pay the amount due with costs.' But the principal
is all that is due on a usurious contract).
"' Cleveland v. Western Loan & Savings Co., 7 Idaho 477, 63 Pac. 885 (1901);
Cornelison v. U. S. Building & Loan Ass'n., 50 Idaho 1, 292 Pac. 243 (1930).
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condition to furnish an abstract showing title in himself free from
encumbrances.'
Performance of a stipulation in a contract requiring such an
abstract is a condition precedent to the vendee's liability,2 and the
mere fact that the vendor actually has perfect title is not sufficient if
the abstract does not so show it.$ As there was not strict compliance
with the condition in the principal case the main problem is the effect,
if any, of the vendee's voluntary acquisition of outstanding title upon
the non-performance of the condition precedent by the vendor.
Where the vendee is in possession under an executory contract of
sale at the time he acquires the outstanding encumbrance or interest,
it is generally held that this inures to the vendor's benefit and may
nof be set up against him by the vendee, for the reason that a person
is estopped to deny the title of one from whom he derives posses-
sion.4 This rule probably does not apply to the present case as it
does not appear that the vendee was ever in possession, but there are
two other principles which seem particularly applicable. First,
the general rule that non-performance of conditions precedent will be
excused if performance was hindered or prevented by the acts or
faults of the other party.5 Under the contract here the vendor has
until a certain date to perfect his title,6 and it should be the duty of
the vendee not to hinder or prevent him from so perfecting title."
'United States Tungsten Mines Co., Ltd. v. Laughran, 67 F. (2d) 226,
(C. C. A. 9th 1933).
'Spooner v. Cross, 127 Ia. 259, 102 N. W. 1118 (1905); Brown v. Widen,
103 N. W. 158 (Ia. 1905).
'Hayne v. Fenton, 321 11. 442, 15 N. E. 877 (1926) ; Lessenich v, Sellers,
119 Ia. 314, 93 N. W. 348 (1903); Austin v. Shipman, 160 Mo. App. 206,
141 S. W. 425 (1911).
'Mumford v. Pearce, 70 Ala. 452 (1881); Lewis v. Boskins, 27 Ark. 61
(1871); BIGEow, EsroPPEL (6th ed. 1913) 590; cf. George v. Roach, 7 La.
Ann. 594 (1852) (this doctrine does not apply where the vendor never had
and gave no possession, and was aware of an outstanding title and knew that he
was selling the property of aother.)
Catanxo v. Jackson, 198 Ala. 302, 73 So. 510 (1916) (failure to produce an
architect's certificate held excused where the other party had discharged the
architect.) ; Kenzig v. Cibula, 40 Ohio App. 557, 179 N. E. 423 (1930) (broker
held entitled to commission from party withdrawing from contract where per-
formance of the contract was a condition precedent to broker's right to com-
mission). 2 WlxlisoN, CONTRAcTs (1920) 1305.
'Handley v. Tibbetts, 16 S. W. 131 (Ky. 1891); Smith v. McMahon, 197
Mass. 16, 83 N. E. 9 (1907) ; Mincey v. Foster, 125 N. C. 541, 34 S. E. 644
(1899).
'Patterson v. Meyerhofer, 204 N. Y. 96, 97 N. E. 472 (1912) ; Bulkin v.
Baird & Roper, 73 N. C. 283 (1875) (held that the vendee impliedly agrees not
to hinder the vendor in perfecting title) ; see MAUPIN, MARKETABLE TITnEs To
REAL ESTAT (3rd ed. 1921) 878 ("The purchaser will not be allowed to fore-
stall the vendor by acquiring an outstanding right and setting it up adversely
to the latter.").
NOTES AND COMMENTS
However, a similar North Carolina case,8 although recognizing such
a duty on the vendee, held that the excuse of the breach of condition
by the vendor, resulting from the hindrance by the vendee did not
entitle the vendor to performance by the vendee, but only to recovery
for his labor and expense in trying to perform. At least one court,9
though, allowed the vendor in effect to enforce performance by the
vendee by awarding the vendor the difference between the contract
price and the amount paid for the outstanding interest by the vendee.
It might be argued that there was no actual hindrance or prevention
by the vendee if he was willing to convey or assign the outstanding
interest to the vendor before the date for performance of the condi-
tion. However, as the purpose of the condition requiring an abstract
is to assure the vendee that he will get perfect title,10 a strict com-
pliance with the contract by such a conveyance and re-conveyance
could have no effect in this respect, and should not be required by a
court of equity unless the vendee has insisted upon it in time for per-
formance by the vendor.
A second objection to the present decision is to be found in the
well settled principle that where by the conduct of one party to a
contract, entitled to the performance of a condition, the other party
has been led to believe that such performance will not be required
until too late to perform, the party so conducting himself is barred
from asserting the right he had.1 1 The vendee's acceptance of con-
veyance from the third party may have led the vendor to believe
that he was accepting this in lieu of strict performance of the contract,
especially if the vendor was instrumental in .procuring the conveyance
from the third party to the vendee, which seems probable here.
It would seem, therefore, that the court might better have held
that there was a substantial performance of the contract by the vendor,
entitling him to a payment of the funds deposited in escrow. A de-
duction from such fuinds, as in the cases where the vendee is in pos-
session,12 of the amount paid for the outstanding interest or its
reasonable value would amply protect the vendee's interests.
J. A. KLE:MEIER, JR.
8 Bulkin v. Baird & Roper, supra note 7 (to the effect that although the
vendor is excused from liability for non-performance of the condition he may
not enforce performance by the vendee) ; cf. Barcello v. Hapgood, 118 N. C.
712, 24 S. E. 124 (1896) (in a rescission suit by the vendee the court allowed
him to recover only the expense incurred in buying up outstanding encumbrance.
It is not clear, however, whether the vendee was in possession or not.)
D Patterson v. Meyerhofer, supra note 7 (vendee outbid the vendor at a sale
of the outstanding interest.).
"
0Fagan v. Hook, 142 Mich. 219, 105 N. W. 155 (1905).
BIGELOW, ESTOPPEL (6th ed. 1913) 717.
SMumford v. Pearce; Lewis v. Boskins, both supra note 4.
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Vendor and Purchaser-Forfeiture Clause in
Land-Sale Contracts.
An installment contract for the sale of land provided in case of
purchaser's default that "this contract shall be forfeited and termi-
nated" and that all payments should be retained by the vendor "in
full satisfaction and liquidation of all damages". The purchaser de-
faulted and set up the forfeiture provision as a defense to an action
at law for the balance due. Held: The vendor had the option to
terminate the contract and retain the payments or the right to a full
performance.'
damages for the purchaser's breach may be classified according to
their terms: namely, (1) where the vendor is expressly given the
option to terminate the contract and retain the payments or to enforce
the contract to complete the sale ;2 (2) where the purchaser is ex-
pressly given the right to forfeit the payments as an alternative to
his performance;3 (3) where the purchaser's default is to make the
contract null and void and cause a forfeiture of all payments made ;4
and (4) where the provision for forfeiture of payments is not ac-
companied by any stipulation as to continuance of the contract.5
The courts generally enforce the express provisions of the con-
tracts falling within the first two classes. Contracts falling within
the last two classes are open to judicial construction on the question
of whether the purchaser can default and set up the forfeiture provi-
sion as a defense against the vendor's action to recover the balance
due. The construction accorded contracts of the latter two classes
is marked by the lack of unanimity.
In construing contracts of the third class the majority of courts
hold that "void" means "voidable" at the election of the vendor.6
The instant case follows this majority by holding, in effect, that
"terminated" means "terminable" at the option of the vendor. On
the contrary, the fact that the contract provides that it shall be "null
and void" upon the purchaser's default has been regarded as indica-
tive of an intention to give the purchaser the option to forfeit or to
perform.7
Contracts providing for the forfeiture of payments as liquidated
'Biscagne Shores, Inc. vs. Cook, 67 F. (2d) 144 (C. C. A. 3rd, 1933).
2 Wandell v. Johnson, 71 Mont. 73, 227 Pac. 58 (1924).
'Cooley v. Call, 61 Utah 203, 211 Pac. 977 (1922).
'T. B. Patter Realty Co. v. Derby, 75 Ore. 563, 147 Pac. 548 (1915) (where
default made the contract "null and.void as to both parties.")5 Dealy v. Klapp, 199 App. .Div. 150, 191 N. Y. Supp. 457 (1922).
8Stewart v. Griffith, 217 U. S. 323, 30 S. Ct. 528, 54 L. ed. 782 (1909).
'Davis v. Isenstein, 257 Ill. 260, 100 N. E. 940 (1913).
NOTES AND COMMENTS
As to contracts of the fourth class the courts do not ordinarily pre-
dude the vendor from enforcing full performance merely because
of provision for a forfeiture as liquidated damages.8 Such provision
is considered as fixing the damages, should the vendor elect to con-
sider that the purchaser's default as a breach of the contract. 9 Thus
the general rule gives the vendor the option to terminate the con-
tract upon the purchaser's default. The reasons for such a rule are
that the defaulting purchaser cannot take advantage of his own neg-
lect and thereby have an option destroying mutuality' ° and creating
a unilateral contract ;11 and that the forfeiture clause is security to
the vendor for prompt performance on the part of the purchaser
rather than a substitute for performance, because the substance of
the agreement is the sale. 12 It may be presumed, therefore, that
the option of terminating the contract belongs to the vendor.'8
An action at law for the balance of the purchase money is in effect
a specific performance of the contract14-and courts of equity gen-"
erally construe these forfeiture clauses the same as do the courts of
law.' 5
Aside from the vendor's right to enforce the contract after the
purchaser's breach, the question arises whether the court will en-
force the provision giving the vendor the right to all payments as
liquidated damages. Where the "liquidated damages" as stipulated
are excessive the court may construe the provision therefor as a pen-
alty and then determine the actual damage to the vendor.'8 Also the
attempt to determine damages by agreement may be considered void
by reason of statutes.' 7
The North Carolina court of equity with "an enlightened con-
science will not be swift to sustain an undertaking to pay liquidated
damages, where there has been no injury and no loss."'' Statutory
8 Kettering v. Eastlock, 130 Iowa 498, 107 N. W. 177 (1906); Lyman v.
Gedney, 114 Ill. 388, 29 N. E. 282 (1885).
'Deshian v. Keshishian, 64 Cal. App. 440, 221 Pac. 669 (1923).
10 Mason v. Caldwell, 10 Ill. 196, 48 Am. Dec. 330 (1848).
' See Westervelt v. Huiskamp, 101 Iowa 195, 70 N. W. 125 (1897).
' Chambers v. Anderson, 51 Kan. 385, 32 Pac. 1098 (1893); Kensely v.
Robinson, 111 Kan. 300, 206 Pac. 877 (1922).
'Cape May Real Estate Co. v. Henderson, 231 Pa. 82, 79 Atl. 982 (1911)
(clear, precise, and unequivocal language is necessary to give purchaser the
option.)2 Crom v. Henderson, 182 Ia. 89, 165 N. W. 397 (1917).
' Note (1924) 32 A. L. R. 584.
"' Stark v. Shemada, 187 Cal. 785, 204 Pac. 214 (1922) (regarding personal
property.)
1I CAL. Civ. CODE (Deering, 1931) §1670.
21 Crawford v. Allen, 189 N. C. 434, 439, 127 S. E. 521 (1925) (purchaser
granted specific performance after he had breached the agreement.)
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provisions in some states relieve a defaulting party from a forfeiture
upon his "making full compensation to the other party, except in cases
of a grossly negligent, willful, or fraudulent breach of duty."' 9 Other
statutes give the defaulting purchaser a period of grace by requiring
the vendor to serve notice of his intention to declare the forfeiture.20
In contracts for the sale of personal property the Uniform Condi-
tional Sales Act provides in case of the purchaser's default after he
has paid half of the purchase price, or in any event on notice from the
purchaser, for a public sale and distribution to the purchaser after
payment of expenses and of the balance due the vendor. 21 This
result might be reached in North Carolina as to contracts regarding
realty. Our court has repeatedly said that the relation between
vendor and purchaser "is substantially that subsisting between a mort-
gagor and a mortgagee", 22 and that "a purchaser of land stands in the
position of mortgagor as to the purchase-money where the title has
been reserved."28 Yet, on another, occasion, our court has said that
the purchaser does not have the right, "as of course," to have the land
sold to pay the debt;. "nor will a Court of Equity decree a sale of it
for such purpose, unless it is made to appear that the land will sell
for a sum sufficient to pay the debt."24 (Italics supplied).
Where a large part of the purchase money has been -voluntarily
paid or where the vendor has recovered, judgment for several install-
ments it is a harsh rule to allow the vendor to retain the land and
also purchase-money amounting to excessive damages for the pur-
chaser's breach. This unjust result may be obviated by any of three
ways: (1) by disregarding the provision for liquidated damages and
determining the actual damage sustained by the vendor; (2) by
statutory enactment providing for a sale of the land and distribution
according to the equities; or, (3) by treating the relation between
vendor and purchaser as one of mortgagor and mortgagee and re-
quiring a foreclosure sale.
W. E. ANGLIN.
'CAL. CIv. CODE (Deering, 1931) §3275; Note (1930) 18 CALIF. L. REV. 681
(referring in margin to identical statutes in Montana, North Dakota and South
Dakota).
-'IowA CODE (1931) §§12389-12394; MINN. STAT. (Mason, 1927) §9576.
'2 UNIFORm LAWs ANN. (1924) 158 [§191.
- Crawford v. Allen, supra note 18.
"'Bank v. Pearson, 119 N. C. 494, 26 S. E. 46 (1896).
2 Allen v. Taylor, 96 N. C. 37, 40, 1 S. E. 462 (1887).
